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DATING THE STATE: THE MORAL HAZARDS
OF WINNING GAY RIGHTS

Katherine Franke*
On August 1, 2009, a masked man dressed in black carrying
an automatic weapon stormed into Beit Pazi in Tel Aviv, the home of
the Aguda, the National Association of GLBT in Israel.1 He opened
fire on a group of gay and lesbian teenagers who were meeting in the
basement for “Bar-Noar,” or “Youth Bar,” killing two people and
wounding at least ten others.2 This terrible act of violence attracted
immediate national and international attention and condemnation.
President Simon Peres declared the next day:
[T]he shocking murder carried out in Tel Aviv
yesterday against youths and young people is a
murder which a civilized and enlightened nation
cannot accept. . . . Murder and hatred are the two
most serious crimes in society. The police must exert
great efforts in order to catch the despicable
murderer, and the entire nation must unite in
condemning this abominable act.3

*
Isidor and Seville Sulzbacher Professor of Law and Director of the
Center for Gender and Sexuality Law, Columbia Law School, email:
kfranke@law.columbia.edu. Particular thanks to Lila Abu-Lughod, Lauren
Berlant, Mary Anne Case, Ariela Dubler, Aeyal Gross, Tayyab Mahmud, Joseph
Massad, Afsaneh Najmabadi, Amr Shalakany, Neferti Tadiar, Kendall Thomas,
Erez Aloni, Janlori Goldman, audiences at the American University in Cairo,
Seattle University Law School, Boston University Law School, Duke Law School,
and Columbia University for thoughtful comments on earlier versions of this
essay, and to Megan Crowley for her able research assistance. © 2012 by
Katherine Franke. All rights reserved.
1.
Murder in the Bar-Noar, Aguda (Aug. 2, 2010),
http://glbt.org.il/en/aguda/articles.php?articleID=
1572; Two Killed in Shooting at Tel Aviv Gay Center, Haaretz (Aug. 1, 2009, 11:14
PM), http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1104506.html.
2.
Murder in the Bar-Noar, supra note 1; Two Killed in Shooting at Tel
Aviv Gay Center, supra note 1.
3.
Roni Sofer, Netanyahu: Israel a Country of Tolerance, Ynetnews.com
(Aug. 2, 2009, 10:56 AM), http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L3755571,00.html (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu added: “We are a democratic
country, a country of tolerance, a law-abiding state, and we will honor
every person regardless of his or her beliefs.”4 When the Prime
Minister visited the Aguda’s building several days later, he remarked,
“This is not just a blow to the gay-lesbian community. This is a blow
to all Israeli youth and Israeli society.”5 President Peres echoed these
remarks at a rally honoring the murdered gay teens: “The gunshots
that hit the gay community earlier this week hit us all. As people. As
Jews. As Israelis.”6
These remarks, while laudable for their strong condemnation
of violence against gay and lesbian people, signal something quite
interesting about the relationship between homosexuality, the state
of Israel, the Jewish people, and the idea of a modern, democratic,
and tolerant state. Israel’s top political leaders did more than express
concern about an act of private violence against members of the
nation’s sexual minority; rather the way they rendered the Aguda
shooting both patriotized its victims and homosexualized Jews and
Israel.7
This essay turns to several diverse sites of global
politics—Israel, Romania, Poland, Iran, and the United States—to
illuminate the centrality and manipulation of sexuality and sexual
rights in struggles for and against the civilizing mission that lies at
the heart of key aspects of globalization. I began this essay with the
discussion of Israel not to single it out, but to illustrate a larger, more
widespread phenomenon. It is worth tracing why, how, and to what
4.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
5.
TA Gay Attack Bears Marks of Terrorism, Jerusalem Post (Aug. 6,
2009, 10:06 AM), http://www.jpost.com/Israel/Article.aspx?id=150999 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
6.
Attila Somfalvi, Peres at Gay Support Rally: Bullets Hit Us All,
Ynetnews.com (Aug. 8, 2009, 10:41 PM), http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/
0,7340,L-3758881,00.html (internal quotation marks omitted).
7.
Israeli politicians, lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT)
activists, and the media overwhelmingly framed the Tel Aviv shooting as a hate
crime, not an act of terrorism, despite the fact that the shooter wore a black ski
mask and sprayed a group of Israelis with an automatic weapon. Surely not every
act of violence that takes place in the state of Israel, whether it is a shooting, a car
accident, or a barroom brawl, is understood as an attack on Israel and the Jewish
people. Some acts of violence are considered random and their meanings do not
exceed their mere violence, while others are labeled acts of terror (a frequent
occurrence in Israel). This one was immediately considered a hate crime—a
violation of the human rights of gay, indeed all, Israelis. Unpacking the
categorization of crime as hate crime or terrorism is a worthy project but one for
another venue.

2012]

Dating the State

3

effect a state’s posture with respect to the rights of “its” homosexuals
has become an effective foreign policy tool, often when negotiating
things that have little or nothing to do with homosexuality.8
I aim in this discussion to intervene in an ongoing
conversation among scholars of international law and politics that
has cleaved into two rather unfriendly camps. On the one side
are human rights groups and activists who seek to secure human
rights protections for subordinated, oppressed, tortured, and
murdered sexual minorities around the globe. They have worked hard
to bring lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people within
the protective infrastructure of the well-organized human rights
communities. On the other side is a group, perhaps most
provocatively represented by Joseph Massad in Re-Orienting Desire:
The Gay International and the Arab World,9 that derides the work of
LGBT human rights actors and organizations for a kind of missionary
zeal to universalize Western, sexualized identities that have little or
no fit with the ways in which sexuality—or, for that matter,
identity—takes form in settings outside the West. “Following in the
footsteps of the white Western women’s movement, which . . . sought
8.
The use of “gay rights [as] . . . a public-relations tool” has been termed
“pinkwashing” by critics. Sarah Schulman, Israel and “Pinkwashing,” N.Y. Times,
Nov. 23, 2011, at A31 (quoting Aeyal Gross, a law professor at Tel Aviv
University) (internal quotation marks omitted). As I have noted elsewhere: “[T]he
pinkwashing critique applies to all states, not just Israel. In the United States
there are many of us who have expressed concern that the Obama administration
is using its good gay rights record (repealing ‘don’t ask/don’t tell,’ backing away
from defending the Defense of Marriage Act, and endorsing marriage equality
rights for same-sex couples, for example) to deflect attention from its otherwise
objectionable policies (aggressive deportation of undocumented people, use of
drones to execute civilians, and failure to prosecute anyone or any entity in
connection with the 2008 financial crisis for example). As some states expand
their laws protecting the rights of LGBT people, pinkwashing has become an
effective tool to portray a progressive reputation when their other policies relating
to national security, immigration, income inequality, and militarism are anything
but progressive.” Katherine Franke, The Greater Context of the Pinkwashing
Debate, Tikkun Mag. (July 3, 2012), http://www.tikkun.org/nextgen/the-greatercontext-of-the-pinkwashing-debate.
9.
Joseph Massad, Re-Orienting Desire: The Gay International and the
Arab World, 14 Pub. Culture 361 (2002); see also Jasbir K. Puar, Terrorist
Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times, at xxiv (2007) (discussing “forms
of queer secularity that attenuate constructions of Muslim sexuality” and noting
the “emergence of a global political economy of queer sexualities”); Sonia Katyal,
Exporting Identity, 14 Yale J.L. & Feminism 97, 100–01 (2002) (“[T]he changing
social meanings surrounding gay or lesbian sexual identities raise deeply complex
questions that are often ignored by scholars and activists in the name of
globalizing gay civil rights.”).
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to universalize its issues through imposing its own colonial feminism
on . . . women’s movements in the non-Western world—a situation
that led to major schisms from the outset—the gay movement has
adopted a similar missionary role,” wrote Massad in Public Culture in
2002.10 Not surprisingly, Massad received some pushback from the
persons and entities he identified as imperialist missionaries who
have sought to redeem their good names and good work.11 In the
middle of these two polarized perspectives lie a few activists and
scholars who have charted a middle course, acknowledging the everpresent risk of imperial effects, if not aims, when undertaking rights
work in an international milieu, while at the same time recognizing
the important and positive work that rights-based advocacy can bring
about.12 For this last group, as for Gayatri Spivak, rights are
something we “cannot not want,”13 yet we proceed with them
cognizant of the complex effects their use entails.
The present essay carries a brief for neither side of this
debate (though I will confess sentiments that strive toward the
middle course). Rather, it seeks to introduce an analysis none of the
disputants have acknowledged: To focus this discussion on the
relationship between LGBT human rights non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) in the metropole and the potentially colonial
subjects they seek to aid misses a third and vastly important actor in
this theater—the state. In hugely interesting ways, states have come
to see that their political power, their legitimacy, indeed their
standing as global citizens, are bound up with how they recognize and
then treat “their” gay citizens. A careful analysis of the role of human
rights mechanisms and institutions in the expansion of human sexual
freedom requires that we recognize and account for the manner in
10.
Massad, supra note 9, at 361.
11.
See, e.g., Scott Long, The Trials of Culture: Sex and Security in Egypt,
Middle E. Rep., Winter 2004, at 12, 18 (“What must be resisted is the political
presumption that all interchange is conquest.”).
12.
See, e.g., Aeyal Gross, Queer Theory and International Human Rights
Law: Does Each Person Have a Sexual Orientation?, 101 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc.
129, 132 (2007) (asking how human rights violations can be addressed “without
imposing a Western model of sexuality” but also without ignoring the realities of
globalization); Teemu Ruskola, Legal Orientalism, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 179, 181, 185
(2002) (analyzing “prevailing cultural prejudices that inform the interpretation of
comparative scholarship on Chinese Law” and examining the “ethics of
comparison”); Amr Shalakany, On a Certain Queer Discomfort with Orientalism,
101 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 125, 128 (2007) (“[W]e might see in U.S. gay-identity
discourse some benefits for the Egyptian bottom.”).
13.
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Outside in the Teaching Machine 51
(2009) (emphasis added).
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which NGOs working in this area, along with the populations they
seek to aid, often find their work and their interests taken up and
deployed by state actors for purposes that well exceed the articulated
aims of something called “human rights.” The Israeli example I
opened with is but one of the ways in which sexuality bears a curious
relationship to global citizenship, politics, and governance.
Illuminating this complex dynamic reveals some patterns:
Modern states are expected to recognize a sexual minority within the
national body and grant that minority rights-based protections. Premodern states do not. Once recognized as modern, the state’s
treatment of homosexuals offers cover for other sorts of human rights
shortcomings. So long as a state treats its homosexuals well, the
international community will look the other way when it comes to a
range of other human rights abuses.

I. ISRAEL
When and how did homophobic violence acquire such
important meaning in Israel, such that the president and prime
minister were expected to, and did, embody the role of national victim
before domestic and international audiences immediately after the
shooting? Why then and not in 2005 when an ultra-Orthodox man
stabbed and wounded three participants in the Jerusalem gay pride
parade,14 or the following year when right-wing activists called for
violent protests against the WorldPride procession in Jerusalem?15
The answer lies in significant part in efforts by the Israeli
government to rebrand itself in a self-conscious and well-funded
campaign termed alternately “Brand Israel” and “beyond the
conflict.”16 In 2006, in large measure in response to its military
14.
See Greg Myre, Israel: 3 Stabbed At Jerusalem Gay Parade, N.Y.
Times, July 1, 2005, at A9.
15.
See Neta Sela, Holy War Against Pride Parade, Ynetnews.com (Oct. 30,
2006, 2:48 AM), http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3321178,00.html;
Efrat Weiss, Baruch Marzel: Pride Parade Will Lead to Violence, Ynetnews.com
(Oct.
18,
2006,
5:48
PM),
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L3316718,00.html.
16.
See David Suissa, Opening Israel, Virtual Jerusalem (Sept. 8, 2011,
9:26 AM), http://www.virtualjerusalem.com/blogs.php?Itemid=4693 (describing
efforts of the Israeli Foreign Ministry to improve Israel’s image by
focusing attention on areas “beyond the conflict’” with the Palestinians as part of
an initiative titled “Brand Israel”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Uriel Heilman, The Difficult Chore of Getting Israel’s Message Across, B’nai B’rith
Mag., Summer 2009, at 20, 24, available at http://www.urielheilman.com/
0601hasbara.html (discussing Israel’s rebranding efforts, including the Israeli
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incursion into Lebanon, Israel found its international “brand
reputation” slipping to a new low. Simon Anholt, who publishes the
influential annual Anholt-GfK Roper Nation Brands Index,17 observed
that in 2006:
Israel’s brand was by a considerable margin the most
negative we had ever measured in the NBI [Nation
Brands Index], and came bottom of the ranking on
almost every question. . . . In response to one of the
questions in [the governance] section of the survey,
‘how strongly do you agree with the statement that
this country behaves responsibly in the areas of
international peace and security?’, Israel scored
lowest of all the 36 countries in the NBI.18
When the Palestinians elected a Hamas-majority government
in January of 2006, the Israelis sensed that they had a public
relations opening. “After decades of battling to win foreign support for
its two-fisted policies against Arab foes, Israel is trying a new
approach with a campaign aimed at creating a less warlike and more
welcoming national image,” wrote a Reuters reporter covering the
meeting of then-Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni with executives from
the British public relations firm Saatchi & Saatchi.19 Livni expressed
the view that the protracted conflict with the Palestinians was
sapping Israel’s international legitimacy. “When the word ‘Israel’ is
said outside its borders, we want it to invoke not fighting or soldiers,
but a place that is desirable to visit and invest in, a place that
preserves democratic ideals while struggling to exist,” Livni told the
British advertising executives who had agreed to work on the Israeli
re-branding effort for free.20
Thus the Foreign Ministry, concerned that the international
community held an unfairly negative view of Israel, launched an

Foreign Ministry’s May 2006 effort to bring a group of American entertainment
reporters to Israel in order to visit trendy Tel Aviv nightclubs, Israeli rock stars,
and gay and lesbian rights groups).
17.
The Anholt-GfK Roper Nation Brands Index, GfK Custom Research
North America, http://www.gfkamerica.com/practice_areas/roper_pam/nbi_index/
index.en.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2012).
18.
Simon Anholt, Places: Identity, Image and Reputation 58 (2010).
19.
Dan Williams, Don’t Mention the War—Israel Seeks Image Makeover,
Reuters, Oct. 26, 2006, available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2006/10/26/ukmideast-israel-image-idUKL2611919120061026.
20.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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extensive public relations campaign “to make people like us.”21 “The
idea here is to have a major branding campaign in America and
Europe,” Gidon Meir, deputy director-general for public affairs at
the Foreign Ministry, told the Jewish Daily Forward in 2005 as the
campaign was getting underway.22 The government, along
with branding experts from the private sector, set out to “re-brand”
the country’s image to appear “relevant and modern” instead of
militaristic and religious.23 According to the Jewish Daily Forward,
“[d]irectors of Israel’s three most powerful ministries agreed on a new
plan to improve the country’s image abroad—by downplaying religion
and avoiding any discussion of the conflict with the Palestinians.”24
The state of Israel is not alone in its turn to public relations
experts as part of a larger “nation-branding” policy. Scholars have
described the marketing of state reputation as a form of “soft power”
whereby the state aims to “persuade and attract followers through
the attractiveness of its culture, political ideals and policies.”25 In this
regard, virtually every country has devoted considerable public funds
to international branding campaigns designed to advance economic
and diplomatic objectives.26

21.
Livni “hired a whole host of public relations firms who have
conducted focus groups and used other mass marketing tools to figure out
how to reinvent Israel in a manner that will make people like us.” Caroline Glick,
Truth in Advertising, Jerusalem Post (Nov. 3, 2006, 3:53 PM),
http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Columnists/Article.aspx?id=40071. This campaign
has specifically included a pitch to make Israel appear more friendly based on its
treatment of gay men and lesbians. See id.
22.
Nathaniel Popper, Israel Aims to Improve Its Public Image, Jewish
Daily Forward (Oct. 14, 2005), http://www.forward.com/articles/2070/ (internal
quotation marks omitted).
23.
Id.
24.
Id.
25.
Evan H. Potter, Branding Canada: Projecting Canada’s Soft Power
Through Public Diplomacy, at i (2009).
26.
See, e.g., Taken by Storm: The Media, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign
Policy in the Gulf War 131–48 (W. Lance Bennett & David L. Paletz eds., 1994)
(examining the role of the media in the development of U.S. foreign policy in the
Gulf War); Jozef Bátora, Public Diplomacy Between Home and Abroad: Norway
and Canada, 1 Hague J. Dipl. 53, 54 (2006) (observing the importance of nationbranding as a basis for arguing for a “more sophisticated understanding of public
diplomacy”); James E. Grunig, Public Relations and International Affairs: Effects,
Ethics and Responsibility, 47 J. Int’l Aff. 137 (1993) (discussing the ethical issues
involved in international public relations); Alice Kendrick & Jami A. Fullerton,
Advertising as Public Diplomacy: Attitude Change Among International
Audiences, 44 J. Advertising Res. 297 (2004) (assessing the effectiveness of an
advertising campaign run by the United States in the Middle East and Asia from
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The re-brand Israel campaign took a decidedly “pink turn” in
2006. The Israeli Ministry of Tourism launched a beef-cakey website
that promoted gay (largely gay male) tourism in Israel,27 and enlisted
the assistance of several NGOs (and GNGOs28). Israeli diplomats
were explicit about the role for gay and lesbian rights in this strategy.
“We’ve long recognized the economic potential of the gay community.
The gay tourist is a quality tourist, who spends money and sets
trends,” Pini Shani, a Tourism Ministry official, told the media after
Tel Aviv was elected a top gay destination in 2012.29 “There’s also no
doubt that a tourist who’s had a positive experience here is of PR
value. If he leaves satisfied, he becomes an Israeli ambassador of good
will.”30 Caroline Glick further noted in her article A Gay Old Time:
“Ministry officials view gay culture as the entryway to the liberal
culture because . . . gay culture is the culture that creates ‘a buzz.’”31
To advance the pink tourism project, the Tel Aviv-Yafo Tourism
Association established the Tel Aviv Gay Vibe campaign in 2010,
offering gay travelers “discounted travel and flights, plus free city

October 2002 to January 2003); Philip Kotler & David Gertner, Country as Brand,
Product, and Beyond: A Place Marketing and Brand Management Perspective, 9 J.
Brand Mgmt. 249 (2002) (exploring whether a country can be a brand); Peter van
Ham, Branding Territory: Inside the Wonderful Worlds of PR and IR Theory, 31
Millennium 249 (2002) (exploring how and why nation branding has become
important); Peter van Ham, The Rise of the Brand State: The Postmodern Politics
of Image and Reputation, 80 Foreign Aff. 2 (2001) (arguing that nation branding is
contributing to the pacification of Europe); Beata Ociepka & Marta Ryniejska,
Public Diplomacy and EU Enlargement: The Case of Poland (Neth. Inst. of Int’l
Relations Clingendael, Discussion Paper in Diplomacy No. 99, 2005) (describing
Polish public diplomacy efforts during Poland’s accession to the European Union
(EU)).
27.
See Gay Israel, http://tourism.glbt.org.il (last visited Oct. 30, 2012)
(noting that on the website you can find “everything you need to know about gay
Israel: pictures, tourist sites, accommodation, attractions, gay night life and
entertainment,” among other things).
28.
GNGO, or governmental NGO, is a term used to refer to a NGO created
by a governmental entity to do work in support of, or in furtherance of, the state’s
interests and aims.
29.
Aron
Heller,
Tel
Aviv
Emerges
as
Top
Gay
Tourist
Destination,
Huffington
Post
(Jan.
24,
2012,
08:46
AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/24/tel-aviv-gay-traveldestinations_n_1227888.html (internal quotation marks omitted).
30.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
31.
Caroline Glick, A Gay Old Time, Jewish Press (Nov. 8, 2006),
http://www.jewishpressads.com/pageroute.do/19838/ (quoting David Saranga,
former Consul for Media and Public Affairs at the Consulate General of Israel in
New York and former Deputy Spokesman for the Israeli Foreign Ministry).
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tours and restaurant vouchers,”32 and launched a website,33 a Twitter
account,34 and a smartphone application.35 Additionally, Israeli
consulates across the United States and Europe frequently sponsor
gay-friendly activities, such as the Tel Aviv Gay Vibe Float in
Chicago’s Gay Pride Parade.36
What distinguished Israel’s branding strategy was not the
degree to which it was chasing gay tourist dollars by explicitly selling
itself as a “gay mecca” (an ironic term to be sure).37 Berlin is

32.
Tel Aviv to Rebrand Itself as Gay Destination, PinkNews (July 22, 2010,
4:18 PM), http://www.pinknews.co.uk/2010/07/22/tel-aviv-to-rebrand-itself-as-gaydestination/.
33.
Tel Aviv Gay Vibe, http://telavivgayvibe.atraf.com (last visited Oct.
30, 2012).
34.
Tel Aviv Gay Vibe, Twitter, http://twitter.com/TelAvivGayVibe (last
updated Sept. 15, 2011).
35.
See Tel Aviv Gay Vibe, iTunes App Store, http://itunes.apple.com/us/
app/tel-aviv-gay-vibe/id433636568?mt=8 (last visited Oct. 30, 2012).
36.
The Consulate General of Israel to the Midwest promoted the Tel Aviv
Gay Vibe Float through Facebook, Israel in Chicago, Tel Aviv Gay Vibe Float @
Chicago Gay Pride Parade 2011, Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/
events/105208666236631/ (last modified June 26, 2011), and through its Twitter
account, Israel in Chicago, Come to “Tel Aviv Gay Vibe float @ Chicago Gay Pride
Parade 2010” Sunday, June 27 from 12:00 pm to 10:00 pm, Twitter (June 16,
2011, 12:10 PM), http://twitter.com/#!/IsraelinChicago/status/
16328567787. There are many other examples of national and local
Israeli government entities enlisting well-known gay people in the project
of public diplomacy. See, for example, the U.S. tour of Assi Azar, a
famous openly-gay television star, Events, Out in Israel Month,
http://www.outinisraelmonth.com/#!events (last visited Oct. 30, 2012) (promoting
several screenings of Assi Azar’s documentary film as part of the Out in
Israel Month Campaign in November 2011, organized by the Consulate General
of Israel to New England); Gal Uchovsky, Left and Gay in Israel, Jerusalem
Post
(Nov.
2,
2011,
10:59
PM),
http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/OpEdContributors/Article.aspx?id=244186 (describing Assi Azar’s tour as “the first
US leg of this grand scheme” organized by the Israeli Foreign Ministry, which has
also included “an exhibition of gay art in London and Manchester with works from
some great Israeli talents”).
37.
Examples of the frequent reference to Tel Aviv as a “gay
mecca” include Aviv Benedix, Tel Aviv, Israel’s Gay Mecca, Invites Gay
Travelers to Come and Visit, Israel Gay News (Dec. 7, 2010),
http://israelgaynews.blogspot.com/2010/12/by-aviv-benedix-israels-secondlargest.html (calling Tel Aviv the “gay Mecca” of Israel and noting that Lonely
Planet and Out Magazine have referred to Tel Aviv as “a kind of San Francisco of
the Middle East” and “the gay capital of the Middle East,” respectively) (internal
quotation marks omitted); Mayaan Lubell, Tel Aviv Reveling in Gay Tourism
Boom, Reuters, Jan. 24, 2012, available athttp://www.reuters.com/article/
2012/01/24/us-israel-tel-aviv-gay-idUSTRE80N12O20120124
(“Leon
Avigad,
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well known for doing so as well, to its great economic advantage. In
fact, Out Now Consulting, the gay public relations firm that designed
the “MyGayBerlin” campaign38 was hired by the Israelis to assess the
feasibility of branding Tel Aviv as an international gay tourist
destination.39 Rather, what differentiated the role of gays in the
Israeli branding campaign was the position it played in a larger
national political agenda, one that exceeded mere niche marketing to
gay tourists. Israeli’s public embrace of gay rights figured at the core
of a project to distract attention from, if not to cancel out, the growing
international condemnation of Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians.
To this end, the Ministry of Public Diplomacy and Diaspora Affairs
has solicited applications from Israeli citizens who would like to serve
as “public diplomats,” traveling abroad (at the state’s expense)
spreading the good word about Israel. The announcement makes
clear that the program “is primarily interested in receiving
applications from people representing the diverse faces of Israeli
society, including . . . representatives of the gay community.”40
Israel’s promotion of its pro-gay policies has, over time,
operated in two registers. First, as laid out above, there was the
deliberate campaign to improve Israel’s international “brand
perception” by highlighting Tel Aviv as a hot and hunky gay tourist
destination. Over time, however, the emphasis has shifted from being
a project of the Tourism Ministry to one used by the Foreign Minister
as a tool of foreign relations. To great effect, Israel has sought to
stake out a moral high ground in comparison with its enemies by
referring to how well it treats its gays. Israeli government officials
and their private sector advocates have seen a strategic advantage in
comparing Israel’s tolerance of gay people with intolerance toward
gays in neighboring Arab countries. Naomi Klein, in an interview,
owner of the gay-friendly Brown hotel, said Tel Aviv has become a ‘gay Mecca’ and
is enjoying a tremendous tourist boom in recent years.”).
38.
Out Now Consulting’s Facebook page states: “Out Now has worked with
German National Tourist Office and Berlin Tourism Marketing for several years
to credentialize these destinations with lesbian and gay travelers.” Out Now, Out
Now Global: Gay Market Leaders—Berlin Tourism Marketing, Facebook (Oct. 29,
2008, 12:02 PM), http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=32620247091.
39.
Press Release, Out Now Consulting, Think You Know All About Gay
Welcoming Tourism Destinations? Think Again: The First-Ever Market Study
into Middle East Gay Travel Unveiled by Out Now at WTM (Oct. 7, 2009),
available at http://www.webwire.com/ViewPressRel.asp?aId=105143.
40.
Asa Winstanley, In New Pinkwashing Recruitment Campaign, Israel
Offers Free Travel for Propaganda Services, Electronic Intifada (Nov. 24, 2011,
10:43 PM), http://electronicintifada.net/blog/asa-winstanley/new-pinkwashingrecruitment-campaign-israel-offers-free-travel-propaganda.
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laid it out plain and simple: “[T]he state of Israel has an open
strategy of enlisting gay and lesbian rights and feminism into the
conflict, pitting Hamas’s fundamentalism against Israel’s supposed
enlightened liberalism as another justification for collective
punishment of Palestinians.”41 Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu’s speech to the U.S. Congress in May 2011 said it best: “In
a region where women are stoned, gays are hanged, Christians are
persecuted, Israel stands out. It is different.”42
As the outcry about the Israeli Occupation of Palestine grew
louder, Israeli voices responded: Look how well we treat our gays! The
complex significance of this official and public use of Israeli
homosexuals can only be fully appreciated when considered in light of
the Israeli security agency Shin Bet’s policy begun in 1967 to “turn”
Palestinian homosexuals into informants through blackmail and
other dirty tactics.43 As recently as May 2012, Shin Bet officers
detained a gay Palestinian man visiting East Jerusalem to see a
medical specialist and told him that if he didn’t inform the Shin Bet
“when he ‘hears about a demonstration, about people, where they’re
going, who’s got a mind to protest, who helps kids who throw stones,
who’s religious, who throws stones at soldiers,’” he would “‘see what
kind of problems [the officers would] make for [him] with the
Palestinian Authority.’”44 Thus, the Ministry of Public Diplomacy and

41.
Cecilie Surasky, Naomi Klein Shows You Can Boycott Israel
Without Cutting Off Dialogue Over Palestine, Alternet (Aug. 31, 2009),
http://www.alternet.org/story/142341/.
42.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Speech to U.S. Congress (May
24, 2011), available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Speeches+by+
Israeli+leaders/2011/Speech_PM_Netanyahu_US_Congress_24-May-2011.htm.
43.
As a result, gay men have gained a reputation in Palestinian society for
being collaborators or snitches, given the widespread belief that gay people are
vulnerable to blackmail by the Israelis. This reputation is not entirely unearned,
given the “success” of Shin Bet’s tactics. See Jason Ritchie, Queer Checkpoints:
Sexuality, Survival, and the Paradoxes of Sovereignty in Israel-Palestine 118
(Jan. 14, 2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois at UrbanaChampagne), available at http://www.ideals.illinois.edu/handle/2142/18233
(noting that the Shin Bet identifies homosexuals as one of the most fruitful
sources for its network of Palestinian collaborators). This fact is vital to
understanding how homophobia in Palestine derives not only from a kind of
sexual revulsion we are familiar with elsewhere, but also from particularly local
political dynamics.
44.
Amira Hass, Shin Bet Inquiry: Did the Israeli Slip His Gay Palestinian
Lover Into the Country Illegally?, Haaretz (May 28, 2012, 2:04 AM),
http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/shin-bet-inquiry-did-the-israeli-slip-hisgay-palestinian-lover-into-the-country-illegally.premium-1.432857.
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Diaspora Affairs’ use of gay public diplomats is, in important
respects, the friendly flip side of that of Shin Bet.
Concerned that the international community was wavering in
its hard line stance toward Iran’s growing nuclear capability, in 2009,
Israel allocated roughly two million dollars to a new campaign to
discredit Iran by specifically highlighting its mistreatment of lesbians
and gay men.45 The Israeli Foreign Ministry confessed that the new
public relations campaign “aims to appeal to people who are less
concerned with Iran’s nuclear aspirations and more fearful of its
human rights abuses and mistreatment of minorities, including the
gay and lesbian community.”46 David Saranga, former Consul for
Media and Public Affairs at the Consulate General of Israel in New
York and former Deputy Spokesman for the Israeli Foreign Ministry,
put it clearly:
Instead of wasting time attempting to persuade them
[i.e., liberal audiences in the United States and
Europe] that I am right, in contradiction of their
worldview, it is better to try to speak to them through
the concepts and values that they understand and
appreciate. For instance, presenting the attitude
towards the gay community in Israel and the equality
it enjoys often cracks the blind wall of criticism which
liberal audiences in the United States may present.47
The Israeli Supreme Court joined the issue in September
of 2010. It held that the City of Jerusalem had engaged in
impermissible discrimination in its ongoing refusal to fund the city’s
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender community center, Open
House.48 Year after year, the City had refused funding requests from
Open House, and Justice Isaac Amit, writing for the Court, ruled
that:
The history of the relationship between the parties
reveals that the appellant’s hand reaching out for
support has met time and time again with the miserly
45.
Barak Ravid, Israel Recruits Gay Community in PR Campaign Against
Iran, Haaretz (Apr. 20, 2009, 9:46 AM), http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/
spages/1079589.html.
46.
Id.
47.
Uri Leventher, The Diplomat Who Tweeted, Globes: Israel’s Business
Arena (Oct. 14, 2009, 6:51 PM), http://www.globes.co.il/serveen/globes/docview.
asp?did=1000505339 (internal quotation marks omitted).
48.
File No. 343/09 Supreme Court (Jer), Jerusalem Open House for Pride
& Tolerance v. City of Jerusalem (Sept. 14, 2010), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription) (Isr.).
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hand of the municipality . . . . We cannot but express
hope that the municipality will not behave stingily
again and that the sides can ‘shake hands’ without
further involving the court.49
Justice Amit declared that equal and respectful treatment of
the gay community was one of the criteria for a democratic state,
noting that this is what separates Israel from “most of the Mideast
states near and far, in which members of the gay community are
persecuted by the government and society . . . .”50 He then mentioned
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s 2007 speech at Columbia
University in which Ahmadinejad claimed that there were no
homosexuals in Iran.51 This statement by the Iranian president
served as evidence, in Justice Amit’s view, of Israel’s comparative
tolerance, modernity, and morality.52 Whether or not this language is
officially a part of the new campaign to use gay rights to whip up
support both domestically and abroad for a military strike against
Iran, the Israeli Supreme Court is certainly pulling an oar in this
project.
Aeyal Gross, a law professor at Tel Aviv University as well as
a sharp critic of Israeli politics generally and LGBT politics in Israel
specifically, wrote about the role of the gay community in the Brand
Israel campaign:
LGBT rights are used as a fig leaf, and the larger the
area that needs to be hidden, the larger the fig leaf
must be. Although conservative and especially
religious politicians remain fiercely homophobic, this
is partially counterbalanced—even in years when a
conservative government has been in power—by the
new homonationalism and the important role gay
rights plays in burnishing Israel’s liberal image.53
Other NGOs closely allied with the Israeli re-branding effort,
such as StandWithUs, a pro-Israeli advocacy organization based in
Los Angeles,54 have explicitly pursued a strategy of responding to
49.
Id. at ¶ 86.
50.
Id. at ¶ 55.
51.
Id.
52.
See id. (describing Israel as “liberal” and “democratic”).
53.
Aeyal
Gross,
Israeli
GLBT
Politics
between
Queerness
and
Homonationalism,
Bully
Bloggers
(July
3,
2010),
http://bullybloggers.wordpress.com/2010/07/03/israeli-glbt-politics-betweenqueerness-and-homonationalism/.
54.
StandWithUs is “an international, non-profit organization that
promotes a better understanding of Israel, through examination of diverse issues.”
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criticism of Operation Cast Lead, a three-week military campaign
Israel began in Gaza in December of 2008,55 by emphasizing how well
lesbian and gay people are treated in Israel. “We decided to improve
Israel’s image through the gay community in Israel . . . .” said an
official with StandWithUs to the Jerusalem Post.56
We’re hoping to show that Israel is a liberal country, a
multicultural, pluralistic country . . . . That is a side of
Israel we are very proud of and that we think should
be shown around the world. . . . As far as a lot of
people are concerned, Israel is Gaza and the West
Bank and tanks, and they don’t see the beautiful
culture and the liberal side.57
Other bloggers similarly saw an opportunity to blunt international
criticism of Operation Cast Lead by pointing to Hamas’s intolerance
toward gay men as a justification for the Israeli military action.58
Back in the United States, StandWithUs circulated a flyer on college
campuses in which it compared Israeli, Egyptian, Jordanian,
Palestinian, Iranian, Lebanese, and other Middle Eastern states’
policies on “sexual freedom” and concludes that Israel is the “only
country in the Middle East that supports gay rights.”59
Stacey Maltin, International Pride Comes to Tel Aviv, Ynetnews.com (June 13,
2009, 9:00 AM), http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3730396,00.html.
55.
Operation Cast Lead, otherwise known as “the Gaza War,” was a threeweek Israeli military offensive begun in late 2008 aimed at stopping rocket fire
from Gaza into Israeli territory. A U.N. report issued after the end of the war
charged both Israel and the Palestinians with war crimes and possible crimes
against humanity. U.N. Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, Human
Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories: Report of the United
Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, Human Rights Council, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/12/48 (Sept. 25, 2009) (by Richard Goldstone et al.).
56.
Mel Bezalel, Gay Pride Being Used to Promote Israel Abroad,
Jerusalem Post (June 7, 2009, 10:13 PM), http://www.jpost.com/Israel/
Article.aspx?id=144736 (internal quotation marks omitted).
57.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
58.
Paula Brooks, What About the Gaza Gays?, Lez Get Real: A Gay
Girl’s View on the World (Jan. 4, 2009, 3:21 PM), http://lezgetreal.wordpress.com/
2009/01/04/what-about-the-gaza-gays/.
59.
Gay
Rights
in
the
Middle
East,
StandWithUs,
http://www.standwithus.com/pdfs/flyers/gay_rights.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2012).
StandWithUs was by no means the first to use this strategy. “As the second
Palestinian Intifada erupted in the autumn of 2000, a curious and persistent
argument began being employed by supporters of the Israeli state. . . . [M]any of
them rather macho young men who never identified themselves as gay and who
almost certainly never lived in an Arab or Muslim country, would stand up and
decry the lack of gay rights in the Palestinian Territories compared to their view
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The timing of the pink turn in Israel’s management of its
international reputation is noteworthy. Convincing the world that
Israel is a gay haven in the otherwise homophobic Middle East began
to figure centrally in the marketing of Israel in the aftermath of
Operation Cast Lead. Military tactics used by both the Israelis and
the Palestinians in the Gaza War were subject to international
criticism; however, the Israelis received particularly harsh
condemnation from the international human rights community for
the targeting of civilians and the use of disproportionate force.60
In the spring of 2011, as the Free Gaza Flotilla was preparing
to sail to the Gaza Strip with the intent of highlighting the Israeli
blockade of Gaza, a slick, well-produced video began to circulate on
Facebook and elsewhere on the Internet, purportedly made by
“Marc”, a “gay rights activist.”61 He reported the “hurtful” and
“heartbreaking” experience of being told by flotilla organizers that
“the participation of [his] LGBT network would not be possible since
it would not be in the overall interest of the flotilla.”62 He then
explained to the camera how the organizers of the flotilla had close
ties to Hamas and highlighted Hamas’s violent hatred of women and
homosexuals.63 He ended with a plea to those who care about human
rights: “Be careful who you get in bed with. If you hook up with the
wrong group you might wake up next to Hamas.”64 The video got
much play, including promotion by the Israeli Government Press
Office on Twitter.65 It was later discovered that “Marc” was an Israeli
of the enlightened policies of Israel.” Blair Kuntz, “Queer” As A Tool Of Colonial
Oppression: The Case Of Israel/Palestine, ZNet (Aug. 13, 2006),
http://www.zcommunications.org/queer-as-a-tool-of-colonial-oppression-the-caseof-israel-palestine-by-blair-kuntz.
60.
The U.N. Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict issued a
controversial report on the force used by both sides in Operation Cast Lead. See
U.N. Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, supra note 55.
61.
marc3pax, Who You Get in Bed With—Human Rights, Gay Rights,
YouTube (June 23, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vhmBbGFJleU.
62.
Id.
63.
Id.
64.
Id.
65.
See Anti-Flotilla Video Fraud Linked to PM Netanyahu’s Office, Official
Israeli
Hasbara
Agents,
Max
Blumenthal
(June
24,
2011),
http://maxblumenthal.com/2011/06/anti-flotilla-video-fraud-has-links-to-pmnetanyahus-office-official-government-hasbara-agents/ [hereinafter Blumenthal]
(“Earlier today, the Israeli Government Press Office promoted the apparent hoax
video on Twitter.”); Benjamin Doherty, Israeli Actor in Anti-Gaza Flotilla
Pinkwashing Video Identified, Electronic Intifada (June 25, 2011, 6:03 PM),
http://electronicintifada.net/blog/benjamin-doherty/israeli-actor-anti-gaza-flotilla-
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actor hired to create the video as a way of discrediting the flotilla’s
aims.66 According to journalist Max Blumenthal, the Government
Press Office’s tweet was a re-tweet from a Netanyahu aide who
seemed to have opened a Twitter account for the sole purpose of
promoting the video.67
The fake anti-flotilla video well illustrates why Israel’s use of
gays in its re-branding campaign has been termed by critics as
“pinkwashing.”68 Israel has effectively used the “gay issue” to advance
a larger political aim of proving that Palestinians are too backwards,
uncivilized, and unmodern to have their own state. The campaign to
create gay solidarity with Israel around the globe has also, often
unwittingly, drawn LGBT communities outside the Middle East into
collusion with the Israeli state’s larger public relations project.69
Israel’s so-called pinkwashing of its treatment of the
Palestinians as a tool to gain international support for its larger
pinkwashing-video-identified (discussing the “YouTube video condemning the
Gaza Freedom Flotilla for alleged homophobia, that was tweeted by the Israeli
Government Press Office”); see also Ethan Bronner, Setting Sail on Gaza’s Sea of
Spin, N.Y. Times, July 2, 2011, at SR3 (“Israeli officials . . . had promoted the clip
on Twitter and Facebook . . . .”); Catrina Stewart, The Hoax Video Blog and the
Plot to Smear a Gaza Aid Mission, Independent (June 29, 2011),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/the-hoax-video-blog-andthe-plot-to-smear-a-gaza-aid-mission-2304030.html
(describing
the
“heavy
promotion by Israeli government bodies on Facebook and Twitter”).
66.
Bronner, supra note 65 (stating that the “video was exposed as a fake,”
posted by an Israeli actor, and noting that Israeli “officials had long used the
talking point that Hamas and other Islamist groups were intolerant of
homosexuality”); Doherty, supra note 65 (revealing Marc’s true identity as Omer
Gershon, a figure “who is relatively well-known in the Israeli gay scene”);
Stewart, supra note 65 (noting that bloggers, after becoming suspicious of the
video’s “slick production and heavy promotion by Israeli government bodies,”
exposed Marc as an Israeli actor named Omer Gershon).
67.
Blumenthal, supra note 65.
68.
See Sarah Schulman, supra note 8 (noting that the “global gay
movement against the Israeli occupation” has named Israel’s tactics
“‘pinkwashing’: a deliberate strategy to conceal the continuing violations of
Palestinians’ human rights behind an image of modernity”); see also Gross, supra
note 53 (criticizing the Israeli pinkwashing campaign as an effort to mask other
human rights abuses occurring regularly within Israel’s borders).
69.
Parents and Friends of Lesbians and Gays (PFLAG) is one
recent example thereof. Katherine Franke, PFLAG Holds Israeli
Pinkwashing Event, Huffington Post (Feb. 22, 2012, 3:21 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/katherine-franke/pflag-israelpinkwashing_b_1290935.html (describing an event with Anat Avissar from Aguda
on February 22, 2012 held at PFLAG headquarters and co-sponsored by the
Israeli Embassy).
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foreign policy aims demands careful analysis. The criticism of Israel
embodied in the term pinkwashing does not deny the fact that gay
men and lesbians enjoy a wide range of civil and other rights in
Israel. They do.70 Nor does the term deny that sexual minorities
struggle in Arab societies. They do.71 Rather, the claim is that
70.
Though, in Israel, as in other places where LGBT rights have gained
traction, those rights were hard-won and need constant defense. As Erez Aloni, an
Israeli queer legal scholar, reminded me: “Israel is a highly heteronormative and
patriarchal state. It is also the case that the movement toward gay rights was
achieved despite the strong resistance of the government—achievements were
made mainly by the courts or the attorney general. What’s more, many parental
rights are banned for same-sex couples; [sic] and there is not even civil
marriage—not to mention same-sex marriage, or inter-religious marriage by the
state.” E-mail from Erez Aloni, Fellow, Ctr. for Reproduct. Rights, Columbia Law
Sch., to author (Feb. 27, 2012, 3:22 PM EST) (on file with author). To be sure,
homophobia and transphobia are to be found throughout Israeli and Palestinian
society. See, e.g., Jason Koutsoukis, Homophobia in Israel Still High but Declining
Slowly,
Says
Survey,
Sydney
Morning
Herald
(Aug.
7,
2009),
http://www.smh.com.au/world/homophobia-in-israel-still-high-but-decliningslowly-says-survey-20090806-ebkb.html (stating that in a 2009 poll by Haaretz,
following the Aguda attack, 46% of 498 people viewed homosexuality as a
“perversion,” while 42% disagreed); Ilan Lior, Civil Patrol “Army” Formed to
Stamp Out Homophobic Attacks in TA Park, Haaretz (Feb. 18, 2012, 1:07 AM),
http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/civil-patrol-army-formed-to-stamp-outhomophobic-attacks-in-ta-park-1.409398 (noting two attacks against gay
individuals in December 2011 and January 2012 near a gay communal center in
Tel Aviv). The increasingly powerful role that the ultra-Orthodox wing
(the Haredim) of Israeli society plays in shaping official governmental policy
and public opinion more generally draws into question the claim that there
is widespread support for gay rights across Israeli society. See, e.g., Ethan
Bronner & Isabel Kershner, Israelis Facing a Seismic Rift Over Role of
Women, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 2012, at A1 (describing the tension between
the ultra-Orthodox Haredim and the views of other Israelis regarding
women); The Takeaway: Israel’s Secular and Moderate Majority Struggling with
Ultra-Orthodox Minority (Pub. Radio Int’l radio broadcast Jan. 16, 2012),
available at http://www.pri.org/stories/politics-society/religion/israel-s-secularand-moderate-majority-struggling-with-ultra-orthodox-minority-7965.html
(describing the tension between the ultra-Orthodox and more moderate sects of
Judaism on women). Similarly, the rise of Hamas in Palestinian society has been
accompanied by a greater intolerance of homosexuality. See, e.g., Press Release,
Int’l Gay & Lesbian Human Rights Comm’n, Palestinian Territories: IGLHRC
Supports Free Expression for ASWAT (Mar. 26, 2007), http://www.iglhrc.org/cgibin/iowa/article/pressroom/pressrelease/415.html (noting that ASWAT, a
Palestinian lesbian organization in Israel, received threats from Islamic leaders
describing the organization as a “fatal cancer”).
71.
In Palestine, the oppression of LGBT people takes place as a cultural,
not legal, matter. Palestinian “law” does not criminalize same-sex sex. The
Palestinian Legislative Council has not adopted a criminal sodomy law. Thus, in
the West Bank, where the Jordanian Penal Code is still applied, there is no legal
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comparisons of this sort are irrelevant. The status of gay people in
Israel is beside the point insofar as fundamental human rights are
understood to be universal and not subject to zero-sum calculations:
Israel’s illegal occupation of Palestine cannot be somehow justified or
excused by its purportedly tolerant treatment of some sectors of its
own population. So too, many LGBT Palestinians bristle when the
Israeli government purports to speak on their behalf and look after
their interests, driving a wedge between their gay-ness and their
Palestinian-ness. Israel expresses an interest in their welfare only so
long as their interests are framed as gay. To the extent that they
identify as Palestinian, Israel’s helping hand cruelly curls into a fist.
Indeed, that helping hand is more symbolic than real, since gay
Palestinian asylum seekers cannot seek refuge in Israel,72 nor can
most gay Palestinians enjoy the hot gay nightlife of Tel Aviv due to
the severe limitations placed on their movement by the laws of
occupation.73

II. IRAN
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s visit to Columbia
University in September of 2007 sharpened my attention to this
queer (and by this I mean odd or curious) role of gay rights in larger
state projects. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was invited
to give a speech at Columbia University against a backdrop of two
parallel U.S.-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq; charges that Iran had
been covertly supplying arms to Shi’a militias in Iraq; intense
criticism by the U.S. government of Iran’s efforts to build nuclear

criminal sanction for same-sex sex, as the Jordanians repealed their sodomy law
in 1951, well before the United States (2003) or the Israelis (1988) did so. Ritchie,
supra note 43, at 114. In Gaza, where law from the British mandate is still
applied, there is a law criminalizing sex between men, thus tracing the legal
sanction of homosexuality in Gaza to colonial, not native, influences. Id.
Unfortunately, the important work done by LGBT activists in Arab settings is
often ignored when Arab societies are portrayed as more homophobic than others.
Al Qaws, Aswat, and Palestinian Queers for Boycott, Divestment and Sanction
are doing great work in Palestine, as are Helem and Meem in Lebanon, and Kifkif
in Morocco. ALWAAN, Bint el Nas, and other websites also provide important
resources to LGBT people in the Arab world.
72.
Michael Kagan & Anat Ben-Dor, Nowhere To Run: Gay
Palestinian
Asylum-Seekers
in
Israel
20–22
(2008),
available
at
http://www.law.tau.ac.il/Heb/_Uploads/dbsAttachedFiles/Nowhere.pdf.
73.
Jason Ritchie’s dissertation offers a nuanced and thoughtful study of
the paradoxes of belonging and disenfranchisement experienced by Palestinian
queers. Ritchie, supra note 43.
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weapons; and ongoing campaigns of highly inflammatory anti-US
rhetoric by the Iranian political leadership and, simultaneously,
highly inflammatory anti-Iranian rhetoric by U.S. political
leadership. This invitation was highly controversial—anti-Iranian
forces arguing that President Ahmadinejad should not be given a
forum in the United States, and others arguing that free speech and
open democracy principles instruct that we should hear from those
whose ideas we find most abhorrent. Still others, though admittedly a
minority in the university community, felt that President
Ahmadinejad represented an articulate, though at times extreme,
counterpoint to U.S. imperialism in the Middle East and Western
Asia. Notably, the Dean of Columbia Law School felt moved to take
sides in this debate and issued a press release the day before
President Ahmadinejad arrived at Columbia expressing anticipatory
condemnation of the Iranian president’s remarks.74 To my knowledge,
this was the first and only time that the law school’s Dean has seen it
appropriate to issue a formal denouncement of any individual—head
of state or otherwise—invited to speak at the university.
President Ahmadinejad’s speech would surely gain national
attention given his views on U.S. involvement in Southwest Asia, his
insistence on the duplicity underlying the Bush Administration’s
nuclear proliferation policies, and, of course, his comments about
Israel and the Holocaust.75 Yet the significance of the Ahmadinejad
speech and the controversy it triggered has to be understood in local
context. In the last several years, a number of Columbia faculty
members who study the Middle East—and have taken positions that
express some sympathy for the situation of the Palestinians—have
been aggressively attacked by organizations in the United States

74.
Press Release, David M. Schizer, Dean & Lucy G. Moses Professor of
Law, Columbia Law Sch., Statement by David M. Schizer Re: SIPA Invitation to
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (Sept. 23, 2007), http://www.law.columbia.edu/
media_inquiries/news_events/2007/september07/deans_statement.
75.
See, e.g., Letter from President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to “the
American People,” (Nov. 29, 2006), available at http://edition.cnn.com/2006/
WORLD/meast/11/29/ahmadinejad.letter/ (accusing the Bush Administration of
foreign policy based on “coercion, force, and injustice,” with reference to the
invasion of Iraq and U.S. support for Israel, and stating that “legitimacy, power
and influence of a government do not emanate from its arsenals of . . . nuclear
weapons”); Iranian Leader Denies Holocaust, BBC News (Dec. 14, 2005, 1:50 PM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4527142.stm (describing Ahmadinejad’s
denial of the Holocaust and anti-Israel rhetoric as well as denunciation of his
statements by Israel, Germany, and the EU).
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charging them with being anti-Semitic or anti-Israeli.76 These
activities have included efforts to intervene in the tenure cases of two
faculty members.77
When President Ahmadinejad arrived, he was “introduced” by
Columbia University’s President Lee Bollinger. President Bollinger’s
direct address to President Ahmadinejad included statements such
as, “Mr. President, you exhibit all the signs of a petty and cruel
dictator.”78 Bollinger criticized the Iranian president’s pursuit of
nuclear weapons; highlighted the mistreatment of women and
homosexuals in Iran; cited Ahmadinejad’s denial of the Holocaust as
evidence that the Iranian president was either “brazenly provocative
or astonishingly uneducated”; and noted as fact Iran’s role in
supplying arms to the militias in Iraq—thereby taking sides in a
highly contested war and making an unsubstantiated claim of Iran’s
involvement in a proxy war in Iraq floated by the U.S. government.79
Bollinger closed with the charge: “I doubt that you will have the
intellectual courage to answer these questions.”80
President Ahmadinejad responded by voicing criticisms of
U.S. policy in the Middle East and Western Asia in tones and in
terms rarely heard in the United States. He pointed out the hypocrisy
of the United States’ efforts to limit the rights of other nations
to nuclear weapons when it regularly violates the nuclear arms

76.
See, e.g., Karen W. Arenson, Fracas Erupts Over Book on Mideast by a
Barnard Professor Seeking Tenure, N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 2007, at B1 (describing
the controversial tenure bid of a Barnard anthropology professor, Nadia Abu ElHaj, whose scholarship received criticism for perceived anti-Israel remarks);
Jennifer Senior, Columbia’s Own Middle East War, N.Y. Mag. (May 21, 2005),
http://nymag.com/nymetro/urban/education/features/10868/ (discussing Columbia
Unbecoming, a 2004 documentary accusing Arab professors of academic
intimidation).
77.
Richard Byrne & Robin Wilson, Palestinian-American Scholar at
Columbia U. Gets 2nd Chance at Tenure, The Chron. of Higher Educ. (May 27,
2008), http://chronicle.com/article/Palestinian-American-Scholar/835.
78.
Helene Cooper, At Columbia University, Ahmadinejad of Iran Parries
and Puzzles, N.Y. Times (Sept. 25, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/25/
world/americas/25iht-ahmedinejad.1.7626558.html?pagewanted=all
(internal
quotation marks omitted).
79.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (describing President Bollinger’s
statements on Iran’s role in Iraq); Annie Karni, Bollinger Stuns Ahmadinejad
With Blunt Rebuke, N.Y. Sun (Sept. 25, 2007), http://www.nysun.com/newyork/bollinger-stuns-ahmadinejad-with-blunt-rebuke/63300/ (describing President
Bollinger’s statements regarding Ahmadinejad’s views on nuclear weapons,
women, homosexuals, and the Holocaust).
80.
Cooper, supra note 78.
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non-proliferation treaty itself,81 and asked why the Palestinian people
should be shouldered with paying for the historical atrocity of the
Holocaust when this genocide was committed by Europeans. He
asked: “[W]hy is it that the Palestinian people are paying the price of
an event they had nothing to do with?”82 In response to a question
from a student in the audience about why women were denied human
rights in Iran, which included a condemnation of the execution of
young men on account of their presumed homosexuality,
Ahmadinejad replied that “[w]omen in Iran enjoy the highest levels of
freedom,” and then asserted: “In Iran, we don’t have homosexuals,
like in your country. . . . In Iran, we do not have this phenomenon. I
don’t know who’s told you that we have it.”83 He then reminded the
audience that in the United States, the state frequently executes
individuals, not only gay people but many others.84
Surprisingly enough, despite ample coverage of President
Ahmadinejad’s visit to Columbia, the parts of the story that got the
most attention were his remarks relating to women and homosexuals
in Iran. As one would expect, domestic gay rights groups issued press
releases the next day denouncing Ahmadinejad’s denial of
homosexuality in Iran, noting that without question there are men
who have sex with men in Iran and they are treated very harshly by
the Iranian government.85 What was most remarkable from my

81.
See President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Keynote Address at Columbia
University World Leaders Forum (Sept. 24, 2007), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/09/24/AR2007092401042.html (“If you have created the
fifth generation of atomic bombs and are testing them already, what position are
you in to question the peaceful purposes of other people who want nuclear
power?”).
82.
“[W]e need to still question whether the Palestinian people should be
paying for it or not. After all, it happened in Europe. The Palestinian people had
no role to play in it. So why is it that the Palestinian people are paying the
price of an event they had nothing to do with?” Id.
83.
Id.
84.
See id. (“Don’t you have capital punishment in the United States? You
do, too.”).
85.
See, e.g., Press Release, Int’l Gay & Lesbian Human Rights
Comm’n, Iran: IGLHRC Deplores Denial of Iranian Homosexuals by
President
Ahmadinejad
(Sept.
34,
2007),
http://www.iglhrc.org/cgibin/iowa/article/pressroom/pressrelease/471.html
(denouncing
President
Ahmadinejad’s denial of the presence of sexual minorities in Iran); Press
Release, Columbia Law Sch. Sexuality & Gend. Law Clinic, Sexuality and
Gender Law Clinic Denounces Anti-Gay Remarks by Iranian President
(Sept. 26, 2007), http://www.law.columbia.edu/media_inquiries/news_
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perspective, however, was how conservative U.S. politicians and
commentators highlighted sexism and homophobia in Iran as a
justification for the denunciation of the Iranian president and as
reinforcement of the widely held view that Iranian culture was
particularly intolerant and primitive compared to Western modernity
and cosmopolitanism.86 Never mind that the U.S. government,
particularly the administration in place during President
Ahmadinejad’s visit, was vulnerable to charges of sexism and
homophobia as well.87
That gender and sexuality emerged as the most salient
aspects of President Ahmadinejad’s speech at Columbia is interesting
not only because of how conservative U.S. politicians showed
themselves to be deeply hypocritical on these issues when it so served
their interests. Perhaps more importantly, the use of the rights of
women and gay people as a device by which the United States
asserted its moral superiority to Iran echoed similar uses of gender
and sexuality in struggles for the West to assert its dominance over
less “civilized” or “modern” peoples. Conversely, resistance to human
rights norms that both construct and then protect a certain type of
gendered and sexualized citizenship have been deployed outside the
West in post-colonial and other contexts as a way of turning back
events/2007/september07/Iran_GLBT (condemning the remarks made by
President Ahmadinejad at the World Leaders Forum at Columbia University).
86.
For example, on the show On the Record w/ Greta Van Susteren, the
following exchange took place between Van Susteren and former Republican
Congressman Newt Gingrich:
GINGRICH: Well, I mean—you and I—I think that treating an
evil leader—let me give you an example. He made a comment in
passing there were fewer homosexuals in Iran.
VAN SUSTEREN: Does he kill them?
GINGRICH: They execute them. I’m just saying nobody got up
and said, [h]ow you can have somebody here who denies the
Holocaust, executes homosexuals, arrests students, tortures
and kills journalists . . . .
On the Record w/ Greta Van Susteren: Newt Gingrich’s Take on Ahmadinejad
(Fox
News
television
broadcast
Sept.
24,
2007),
available
at
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,297973,00.html.
87.
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Fed’n of America, Inc., George W. Bush’s
War On Women: A Chronology (2003) (outlining actions taken by former
President Bush that indicate a steady pursuit to eliminate reproductive freedom);
Barbara Morrill, A Surgeon General Who Will “Cure” Gays?, Daily Kos (June 1,
2007, 9:07 AM), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2007/06/01/341697/-A-SurgeonGeneral-Who-Will-Cure-Gays- (concerning former President Bush’s decision to
nominate a Surgeon General who had co-founded a church that “ministers to
people who no longer wish to be gay or lesbian”).
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Western hegemony and drumming up forms of nationalism.88 The
nation comes to acquire both a gender and a sexual orientation along
the way.
Here we see the role of human rights law—particularly rights
securing equality for gay men and lesbians—in the expansion of neoliberalism and its fellow traveler, capitalism, in less economically
developed precincts of the world. Revulsion toward gay men gets
articulated as the most visible trope deployed by political leadership
seeking to hold on to local control and governance, while tolerance
toward homosexuality is demanded of those nations that seek
membership in international economic and political communities. In
the following sections I aim to illustrate these points through
struggles for political and economic power in Romania and Poland
and then will circle back to President Ahmadinejad’s visit to
Columbia University and the Israeli pinkwashing campaign. I will
conclude with reflections on the ethical predicament for LGBT human
rights advocates posed by the complex relationship between rights,
nationalism, and global citizenship.

III. ROMANIA AND POLAND
Human rights norms provide as their justification and their
source a set of universal and generalizable claims about the moral
worth of all persons that requires the recognition of the inherent
dignity and equality of all members of the human family, thereby
entitling each of us to a set of inalienable rights which any
government must respect as a condition of its legitimacy.89 In the
post-World War II era an adherence to human rights has become
among the most important criteria by which a nation might prove

88.
“[S]tate efforts to eradicate the traces of empire and to resurrect an
authentic post-colonial nation have produced sexual subjects that serve as a . . .
reminder of a demonized colonial past and absence.” Katherine Franke, Sexual
Tensions of Post-Empire, 33 Stud. L. Pol. & Soc’y 63, 64 (2004). “[A] set of
homosexual social and legal subjects have been created by the . . . government,
and once so formed and disciplined, ‘human rights’ rides into the rescue to liberate
them from social and legal opprobrium. . . . [T]he assistance of the international
human rights establishment has further reinforced post-colonial nationalist
rhetoric that located individual rights as a Western norm that threatens to
undermine authentic . . . culture.” Id. at 65.
89.
See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art.
1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) (“All human beings are born free and
equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reasons and conscience and
should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.”).
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itself to be civilized and modern.90 Inclusion in various institutions
that embody modern global citizenship, such as the United Nations,
the International Monetary Fund, NATO, and regional trade
organizations, have come to require from applicants that they
recognize a form of “individualized humanity” in their own citizens,
and that those citizens possess certain inalienable rights by virtue of
that humanity.
For example, the European rules that define whether a
country is eligible to join the European Union (EU), commonly called
the Copenhagen Criteria, set forth the following requirements:
Membership requires that the candidate country has
achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect
for and, protection of minorities, the existence of a
functioning market economy as well as the capacity to
cope with competitive pressure and market forces
within the Union.91
Accession states—those states that seek admission to the EU—are
asked to undertake two important reform efforts to qualify for
admission: One having to do with human rights and the other having
to do with open markets.92 However, in order to commence
negotiations with a state seeking membership, the EU insists only
that the accession state have made progress on the human rights and
rule of law front.93 These norms are given relative importance over
the values of open markets, privatization, and fiscal and monetary
stability.94
Romania’s effort to secure membership in the EU provides an
interesting example of how admission to modern economic society
turns on the differentiation between civilized, rights respecting
Europe and the non-rights respecting states to its east and south.
Under this differentiation, Europe is economically disciplined, global,
and modern, whereas its other is more primitive, tribal or local,
communitarian, and economically antiquated. Romania’s campaign to
join the EU started in 1993 with its membership in the Council of
Europe and culminated in its full EU membership in 2007. It offers a
90.
See, e.g., Peter Fitzpatrick, Modernism and the Grounds of Law 121
(2001) (noting the importance of “the standard of civilization”).
91.
Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen European Council (June 21–22,
1993).
92.
Id.
93.
Id.
94.
Id.
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useful example of the essential, but in many ways bankrupt, role of
human rights law—particularly the rights of sexual minorities—in
the evolution of a state’s “credentialization” as global citizen.
Romania has had a shocking modern history of human rights
violations, from Nicolae Ceausescu’s rule through the postCommunist era.95 The criminal treatment of homosexuality, the
invasion of women’s bodies in the name of the nation, and
discrimination against Roma, were among the most extreme forms of
state-sponsored rights-abridging behavior.96 In 1968, the socialist
Romanian government enacted Article 200, which criminalized sexual
acts between persons of the same sex in any setting—expanding into
the private domain a law that had previously criminalized only such
acts that created a “public scandal.”97 Article 200 greatly increased
the penalties for homosexuality, mandating sentences of one to five
years.98 This new law supplemented Ceausescu’s pro-natalist decrees
that compelled women to undergo periodic and compulsory
gynecological examinations and severely punished abortions.99 In
1986, Ceausescu declared: “[T]he fetus is the socialist property of the
whole society. Giving birth is a patriotic duty . . . . Those who refuse
to have children are deserters . . . .”100 To a regime that predicated its
authority on its surveillance of every detail of existence, there was no

95.
See Tom Gallagher, Romania After Ceausescu: The Politics of
Intolerance (1995) (examining how officials have abused nationalism in post-1989
Romania to deflect criticism for human rights violations); see also Human Rights
Watch, Struggling for Ethnic Identity: Ethnic Hungarians in Post-Ceausescu
Romania (1993) (exploring the dramatic rise in racist propaganda in Romanian
press and politics after the fall of Ceausescu in 1989).
96.
See, e.g., U.S. Helsinki Watch Comm., Violations of the Helsinki
Accords, Romania: A Report Prepared for the Helsinki Review Conference 39, 45
(1986) (reporting state discrimination and persecution against ethnic minorities
in Romania as well as “deep infringements of the right to privacy,” including
governmental pro-natalist campaigns); Charlotte Hord et al., Reproductive Health
in Romania: Reversing the Ceausescu Legacy, 22 Stud. Fam. Plan. 231, 231–34
(1991) (describing “the world’s most rigidly enforced pronatalist population policy”
under Ceausescu’s regime and the “challenges . . . facing Romania in the areas of
reproductive health, family planning, and sex education” in the post-Communist
era).
97.
Ingrid Baciu, et al., Unspoken Rules: Sexual Orientation and Women's
Human Rights 156-58 (Rachel Rosenbloom ed., 1996); Aleksandar Štulhofer,
Sexuality and Gender in Postcommunist Eastern Europe and Russia 61 (2005).
98.
Štulhofer, supra note 97.
99. Ctr. for Reprod. Law & Policy, Women’s Reproductive Rights in Romania:
A Shadow Report 14–16 (2000); U.S. Helsinki Watch Comm., supra note 96, at 45.
100.
Hord, supra note 96, at 232 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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realm beyond the interest of the state.101 Liberal rights such as
privacy thus found no traction in socialist Romania for women or for
sexual minorities.102
After the violent overthrow of the socialist government in
1989, the laws prohibiting abortion were overturned,103 yet the laws
criminalizing sodomy were not.104 Following complaints from Council
of Europe rapporteurs, the Romanian government surrendered to the
fact that its economic future lay to the West and reviewed its laws
outlawing homosexuality when it sought Council membership.105
Responding to European demands that Romania modernize its
criminal laws, Romanian Justice Minister Petre Ninosu shot back: “If
we let homosexuals do as they please, it would mean entering Europe
from behind.”106 Another Romanian politician remarked at the time:
“[O]f course the EU parliament wants us to abolish Article 200—they
are all gay.”107
Just as women’s bodies were seized to play a key role in
Ceausescu’s nationalistic project, Romanian politicians used a
homosexualized European body to aid in their own nationalist project
by resisting repeal of Article 200. The nation took on the form of a
sexualized body that was threatened with violation from the rear
when the Council of Europe insisted that it bend to European values.
We witnessed the same fears expressed by the president of
Poland in the spring of 2008 when he used the specter of gay
marriage to trigger national resistance to Poland’s ratification of the
101.
See Gail Kligman, The Politics of Duplicity: Controlling Reproduction
in Ceausescu’s Romania 22 (1998).
102.
See id. (“By legislating reproductive behavior, the state intruded into
the most intimate realm of social relations.”).
103.
U.N. Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Population Div., Abortion Policies:
A Global Review, at 54, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/SER.A/129/Add.2, U.N. Sales No.
E.95.XIII.24 (2002).
104.
Homosexuality was illegal under Romanian law until 2001. Shirin
Wheeler, Romania’s Gays Celebrate End of Ban, BBC News (Dec. 20, 2001),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1721661.stm; Sinziana Carstocea, Romania, in
The Greenwood Encyclopedia of LGBT Issues Worldwide 347, 352 (Chuck Stewart
ed., 2010).
105.
See Eur. Parl. Ass. Deb. 27th Sess. 929–30 (Sept. 24, 1996) (discussing
the changes Romania had to make to its Penal Code as a condition to be accepted
as a member of the Council of Europe).
106.
Human Rights Watch, supra note 95, at 31–32 (internal quotation
marks omitted). It is worth noting that Ninosu went on to become a member of
the Romanian Constitutional Court.
107.
Carl F. Stychin, Governing Sexuality: The Changing Politics of
Citizenship and Law Reform 122 n.7 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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new EU constitution. In a nationally televised speech, President Lech
Kaczynski appealed to threats to Poland’s national values and
morality if the new constitution were ratified,108 since it included the
terms of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights—a document
that includes rights for homosexuals.109 President Kaczynski had his
staff download a video from the Internet of two men marrying and
used it as a backdrop to his address to the nation, while patriotic
Polish music played along.110 The two men, who live in New York and
had posted the video on the Internet for their friends and family after
they married in Canada, were outraged when they heard that they
were being used as a homophobic prop to fortify Polish nationalism.111
Ultimately Romania repealed Article 200, and in 2007 it was
admitted to the EU.112 The coupling of a “victory” for gay people in
Romania with every Romanian’s long term economic interests by
virtue of membership in the EU teaches us something important
about the power and limits of using human rights law as the lever
with which to pry more “backward” nations from their pre-modern
ways and induct them into modern global citizenship.
Just as the Council of Europe pressured the Romanian
government to repeal its laws criminalizing homosexual conduct, the
Dutch government began funding a Romanian NGO called ACCEPT
that would work toward the repeal of Article 200.113 ACCEPT defined
itself explicitly as a human rights organization, not as a local gay and
lesbian grassroots service provider.114 By formally affiliating with the
largest federation of lesbian and gay associations in the Netherlands,
and by receiving funding from the Dutch Foreign Ministry, ACCEPT’s
main mission was limited exclusively to the repeal of Article 200.115 It

108.
Address of President Lech Kaczynski (TVP1 television broadcast Apr.
1, 2008), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cqbHnh7WNpU.
109.
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 21, Dec.
18, 2000, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1 (“Any discrimination based on any ground such as . .
. sexual orientation shall be prohibited.”).
110.
Address of President Lech Kaczynski, supra note 108.
111.
Sewell Chan, Political Fight in Poland Hits Home for Gay Pair, N.Y.
Times, March 20, 2008, at B5.
112.
EU Approves Bulgaria and Romania, BBC News (Sept. 26, 2006, 1:56
PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5380024.stm.
113.
See For a More Gay Romania, ACCEPT, http://accept.ong.ro/
foramoregayromania.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2012).
114.
See ACCEPT Association, ACCEPT, http://accept-romania.ro/en/
despre-noi/asociatia-accept/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2012).
115.
See About Us, ACCEPT, http://accept-romania.ro/en/stiri/campanie-devara/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2012).

28

COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

[44:1

did not partner with other human rights campaigns in Romania, such
as those launched on behalf of the Roma or women, nor did it see
itself as enabling or responding to a local or indigenous grassroots
gay or sexual rights movement in Romania.
Instead, ACCEPT was both responding to and speaking to an
international audience in Western Europe. Much of the human rights
script, therefore, was already written—ACCEPT merely had to
perform it in Romania in a manner that was plausible enough to
satisfy audiences in Amsterdam and Brussels.
What do I mean by this script? Here as elsewhere, European
rapporteurs were not ethnographers prepared to find new forms of
sexual affiliation that were the unique product of a post-Communist
Romanian culture. Nor were they prepared to adapt their normative
tools to respond to those unique conditions. Quite the contrary,
European rapporteurs went looking for something familiar—a society
that had homosexuals just like their homosexuals, who were
discriminated against in predictable ways by public and private
actors, and who should and could seek legal protection for that
discrimination from the state. For a state like Romania, serious
candidacy for admission to the EU meant performing plausible
modernity by having a recognizable minority of citizens who
understood themselves to “have” a gay identity just as in the
European metropole and who could then be recognized by the state as
rights-bearing subjects. The extent of the state’s obligation with
respect to these subjects was the annunciation of an antidiscrimination norm and a minimal infrastructure of enforcement.
This is what the Dutch paid for when they underwrote the
activities of ACCEPT, and that is what they got. ACCEPT is an
organization that did not primarily grow out of Romanian society, but
instead played an important role as a bridge between the wellendowed European West and the needy European East. Although the
EU parliamentarians insisted, in letters to the prime minister of
Romania, that they were looking forward to welcoming Romania into
the EU so long as they “share the same values,”116 Romania was able
to satisfy the Copenhagen criteria simply by repealing Article 200.
This is the legally formalistic price of admission into the economic
community of the EU.
The kind of gay subject these politics call up is one whose
identity would coagulate in public institutions such as gay pride
parades and gay community centers, where “gayness” could be
116.

Stychin, supra note 107, at 134-35.
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isolated and privileged over other kinds of identification grounded in,
for instance, class, ethnicity, or religion.
Since 2004, a gay and lesbian pride parade, known as Gay
Fest, has been held in Bucharest every June.117 The first parade was
named the Diversity Festival.118 In 2006, Romania was named by
Human Rights Watch as one of five countries in the world that had
made “exemplary progress in combating rights abuses based on
sexual orientation or gender identity.”119 Again, Western Europe got
what they asked for in Romania—a Western style gay-rights
movement that demonstrated the kinds of progress that mark a
society being “civilized” by adherence to regional human rights norms
as the price of membership in a global community.
It is impossible to say whether a kind of “gay identity” would
have emerged in Romania in the absence of the type of interpellation
that Western European parliamentarians insisted upon as a
condition of EU membership—calling up recognizable gay subjects
who could then be protected by human rights laws. Yet the almost
singular focus on sexual rights as the marker of modernity has been
accompanied by the neglect of other types of security and rights-based
values. The “shadow report” prepared by Romanian women’s rights
NGOs to supplement the report of the Romanian government to the
Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women (CEDAW) in 2000 detailed the horrendous treatment of
women.120 Marital rape remains legal, there are no laws prohibiting
domestic violence, laws prohibiting sex discrimination in the
workforce are not enforced, and the maternal mortality rate is among
the highest in all of Europe due to the fact that unsafe abortions
remain the primary method of birth control in the absence of
adequate family planning information and resources.121 More recent
117.
See About Us, Gay Fest, http://www.gay-fest.ro/en/despre-noi/ (last
visited Oct. 30, 2012).
118.
Info, Gay Fest, http://www.gay-fest.ro/en/despre-gayfest/gayfest2004/info/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2012).
119.
“Hall of Shame” Shows Reach of Homophobia: On International
Day Against Homophobia, Violations Mixed With Victories, Human Rights Watch
(May 17, 2006), http://www.hrw.org/news/2006/05/16/hall-shame-shows-reachhomophobia.
120.
Women’s Non-Governmental Orgs. of Romania, Women’s Status in
Romania: A Shadow Report to the CEDAW 23rd Session (Apr. 2000), available at
http://legislationline.org/documents/action/popup/id/7703.
121.
See id. at 8–11, 18–22; see also Ctr. for Reprod. Law & Policy,
Women’s Reproductive Rights in Romania: A Shadow Report (2000), available at
http://www.reproductiverights.org/pdf/sr_rom_0600_eng.pdf.
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reports on the rights of Romanian women, particularly Roma women,
show little improvement.122
What is more, Romania has received severe criticism for its
willingness to allow the United States’ CIA to set up secret detention
camps and “black sites” in Bucharest where detainees have
reportedly been subjected to sleep deprivation, slapping, and stress
positions.123 Perhaps this is the lesson of Romania’s entrance into
modern Europe: So long as you treat your gay people well, we’ll look
the other way when it comes to other human rights abuses, or worse,
ask that you host the export of our own human rights dirty secrets.
The entrance of Romania into the economic and political
community of Europe shows us several important things. During
periods of political transition, sexuality has a curious way of surfacing
when external threats are homosexualized as a means of solidifying
or fortifying national identity within. The body of the nation becomes
sexualized, if not heterosexualized, and a virulent and revitalized
national heterosexual body stands ready to battle penetration or
violation from the extraterritorial sexual other. When that
heterosexualized state later seeks membership in a global political
and/or economic community, it must revisit its sexual identity in
ways that satisfy twenty-first century braiding of neo-liberal
economics and sexual politics. This amounts to what is surely a tricky
undertaking that involves identity management as part of a larger
project of global citizenship. The state must convince a global
audience of a newly found and genuinely felt tolerance toward
homosexuality, including patriating its gay nationals, while hanging
on to its own heterosexual reputation. The state’s new homotolerance, some might even call it a kind of “metro-sexuality,”
becomes
a
kind
of
calling-card
carried
by the Finance and Foreign Ministers when they visit Geneva (WTO),
Washington (IMF, United Nations) and Brussels or Strasbourg
(European Parliament).
The Romanian experience shows us how the drive for
economic inclusion in Western Europe—a drive that was understood
explicitly by the Europeans as a process of civilizing the Romanians—
122.
See European Roma Rights Ctr. & Romani CRISS, Shadow
Report: United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination against Women in Romania for Its Consideration at the
35th Session 15 May to 2 June 2006 (2006), available at http://www.iwrawap.org/resources/pdf/Romania(2)_SR.pdf.
123.
Scott Horton, Inside the CIA’s Black Site in Bucharest, Harper’s Mag.
(Dec. 8, 2011, 11:37 AM), http://harpers.org/archive/2011/12/hbc-90008343.
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justified the renovation of the heterosexualized body of the nation,
while conjuring up a homosexualized private citizen. The new gay
citizens this process produced emerged from a form of identity politics
that is familiar to late-capitalist societies, but had few roots in postcommunist cultures playing catch up, as was Romania. Identity
becomes individualized, indeed privatized, along with the economy.
So too, sexual orientation becomes a private fact about a person that
should not have public consequences, such as discrimination in
employment or the ability to serve in the military. Well-written laws,
adequately enforced, can take care of the problem. Little or no effort
was made to strengthen the institutions of civil society that might
check the distributional inequalities of capitalist culture, might balk
at the conscription of the West’s weaker economic players in the
United States’ “global war on terror,” and might have sought
solidarity with other oppressed groups such as the Roma and women.
Here, as in other contexts, international gay rights NGOs risk being
used as the front end of the plow that opens up the path for new
markets for European goods, new low-wage workers, and a much
weaker social welfare state.
Certainly these events echo similar European efforts to
advance forms of economic and human rights-based freedoms in the
states formerly behind the Soviet Iron Curtain. In these contexts,
both the cultural intelligibility of a gay citizen/subject and his or her
rights-bearing status stand as the metonyms of freedom. That is, the
lack of freedom is most convincingly evidenced by two things: First,
the absence of a certain percentage of the population who will stand
up, wave a rainbow flag, and proclaim their authentic homosexual
identity (“We Are Family,” as the Sister Sledge gay anthem
declares124); and second, a state that is expected to recognize them by
and through the enactment of anti-discrimination legislation. An
international audience is fully prepared to stand in judgment of the
societies who cannot produce a particular kind of gay citizenry and
who refuse to extend human rights protections to that citizenry on
the basis of their identity.
This formulation of the necessary relationship between
identity formation, recognition, and rights was concretized in the
Yogyakarta Principles in 2006 through a set of twenty-eight precepts
that seek to integrate concerns about sexual orientation and gender

124.

Sister Sledge, We Are Family (Atlantic Records 1979).
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identity into the main of human rights law and norms.125 For present
purposes, Principle 3 is most important, holding that “[e]ach person’s
self-defined sexual orientation and gender identity is integral to their
personality and is one of the most basic aspects of self-determination,
dignity and freedom.”126 Just as Article 15 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights sets out that “[e]veryone has the right
to a nationality . . . [and] no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his
nationality or denied the right to change his nationality,”127 the
Yogyakarta Principles are animated by a commitment to establish a
universal and fundamental right to a sexual orientation and gender
identity.128 This seemingly progressive, inclusive, and dignityrespecting addition to the inventory of fundamental rights secured by
international law makes an epistemic claim that risks a kind of
violence in many contexts outside of the United States, Western
Europe, and their satellites. It takes as given that all persons do, or
should, understand themselves to have a sexual orientation and a
gender identity, and that this sexually-oriented and gendered sense of
self is fundamental not only to how they know themselves but
fundamental to who they are.
A member in good standing in the community of human
rights-abiding states (in contrast with those that are human rightsdenying) must recognize this universal “fact” of humanity—that
human bodies everywhere organize and then sort themselves
according to a sexualized orientation. To deny or question the
universality of this truth of the human is prima facie evidence of
bigotry and intolerance.

IV. PRESIDENT AHMADINEJAD COMES TO COLUMBIA
This brings me back to President Ahmadinejad’s visit to
Columbia. President Bollinger’s “introduction” of the Iranian leader
was nothing if not a spectacular display of masculinity. The moment
seemed to demand the performance of a kind of national manhood.
125.
Int’l Comm’n of Jurists, Yogyakarta Principles, Principles on the
Application of International Human Rights Law in relation to Sexual Orientation
and Gender Identity (2007). In November of 2006, “a distinguished group of
human rights experts” gathered in Yogyakarta, Indonesia to draw up “principles
on the application of international human rights law in relation to sexual
orientation and gender identity.” Id. at 7.
126.
Id. at 11.
127.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res 217 (III) A, supra
note 89, art. 15.
128.
Int’l Comm’n of Jurists, supra note 125, at 8–9.
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Having called President Ahmadinejad a “petty dictator,” Bollinger
closed his remarks with a put down, chiding the little man who wore
no tie for lacking the courage, or even the capacity, to parry the
thrust of Bollinger’s accusations.129 The occasion required that
Bollinger get all gender-y, as Eve Sedgwick would have put it.130
President Ahmadinejad’s comment that “[i]n Iran, we don’t
have homosexuals like you do in your country,” and that “women in
Iran enjoy the highest levels of freedom,” offered evidence of what
some in the United States thought they already knew about Iran and
its political leadership: It is tyrannical, pre-modern, uncivilized, and
not to be trusted—not trusted about its knowledge of its own people,
nor about other issues such as its nuclear ambitions, its role in
supporting the insurgency in Iraq, or its threat to Israel. While there
may be some debate among experts about the extent and aims of
Iran’s nuclear program, no thinking person could doubt the existence
of homosexuals in Iran and their entitlement to the protection of
human rights law.
Or could they? What does it mean that here, as elsewhere, the
denial of homosexuality and the persecution of sexual deviance are
used as the ideal cudgel with which international actors could attack
the Iranians?
First of all, I hasten to point out that the question of
homosexuality in Iran is not one obviously amenable to a yes/no
answer. Of course sexual identification, desires, and identities in Iran
don’t line up precisely as they do in the United States or in Western
Europe. Why would they? Again, Joseph Massad has done a more
than ample job of unpacking this complex issue in the Arab world,

129.
Cooper, supra note 78 (“[President Bollinger] said, ‘Mr. President
[Ahmadinejad], you exhibit all the signs of a petty and cruel dictator’ adding, ‘You
are either brazenly provocative or astonishingly uneducated. . . . I doubt,’
Bollinger concluded, ‘that you will have the intellectual courage to answer these
questions.’”).
130.
See Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Gosh, Boy George, You Must be Awfully
Secure in Your Masculinity!, in Constructing Masculinity 11, 16 (Maurice Berger
et. al. eds., 1995). In many respects the intended audience for Bollinger’s
“Iranophobic” remarks was not present in the room. Many alumni had adamantly
denounced the university’s invitation to the Iranian president on the ground that
it amounted to a condonation of his anti-Zionist views. Furthermore, President
Bollinger had received substantial pressure from New York politicians to cancel
the Ahmadinejad event. He needed their support for plans to proceed with the
expansion of the university campus into West Harlem despite, and sometimes
over, the objections of local residents.
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and his insights apply with equal force in Iran.131 Afsaneh
Najmabadi’s and Pardis Madhavi’s works have been equally
important in exploring the contours of sexual and gender identity in
modern Iran.132 While I don’t imagine that President Ahmadinejad’s
claim that there are no homosexuals in Iran was a nuanced reference
to Massad’s, Najmabadi’s or Mahdavi’s analysis of sexuality in
Islamic countries, I do think that a thoughtful response to President
Ahmadinejad’s statement requires sensitivity to the imperial nature
of the insistence upon the universal, stable, and binary fact of heteroand homosexualities by some of the international human rights
community.
Nonetheless, what of the exact words he used in his speech? I
thought it might be useful to check the translation of his comment
about gays in Iran. I asked an Iranian colleague, Professor Hamid
Dabashi, whether the translation we received of the speech was
accurate. As translated by Professor Dabashi while listening to the
recording of the event, the exact words the Iranian president used
were: “[I]n Iran we do not have homosexuals as you do. In our country
there is no such thing. In Iran such things—in Iran—in Iran—there
is no such thing. I have no idea who has said this to you.”133 Professor
Dabashi raised two points about President Ahmadinejad’s word
choice. First, he focused on the phrase “as you do,” noting that it
could be “implicitly suggesting that we have a different kind of
homosexuality in Iran,” or it could mean, “we don’t have them at
all.”134 Dabashi’s second point is subtler, and muddies the issue far
more greatly. He wrote to me:
[N]ow the other issue is that when the second time
he says “In Iran there is no such thing” the phrase
that he uses is literally “such a thing has no external
presence/vojud e khareji nadareh”—now this phrase
“vojud e khareji nadareh” idiomatically means
“does not exist” but literally means “has no external
131.
Massad, supra note 9.
132.
See, e.g., Afsaneh Najmabadi, Women with Mustaches and Men
Without Beards: Gender and Sexual Anxieties of Iranian Modernity (2005)
(discussing evolving social views in Iran in the areas of gender and sexuality since
the 19th century); Pardis Mahdavi, Passionate Uprisings: Iran’s Sexual
Revolution (2009) (describing sexual habits and social views of modern Iranian
youth and their effect on Iranian society).
133.
E-mail from Hamid Dabashi, Hagop Kevorkian Professor of Iranian
Studies & Comparative Literature, Columbia Univ., to author (Feb. 12, 2011,
12:29 PM EST) (on file with author) (internal quotation marks omitted).
134.
Id.
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existence”—yet another polyvalent phrasing that
has embedded in it the suggestion that homosexuality
is not a socially acceptable behavior in Iran,
namely we do not see it in public space—adding
credence to the first reading of “as you do” I suggested
above—namely, again a sympathetic reading of
Ahmadinejad that in Iran these are private
matters.135
Far too many human rights groups, politicians, and media
outlets outside Iran responded to President Ahmadinejad’s remarks
with the demand for recognition: “Yes, of course there are gay people
in Iran!” Even my own colleagues at Columbia Law School’s Sexuality
and Gender Law Clinic issued a press release immediately after
the speech expressing outrage at the Iranian president’s denial of
a gay Iran, at the persecution of lesbian and gay Iranians by
the government.136 They unfavorably compared that horrendous
treatment to the favorable constitutional protections that
homosexuals receive in the United States.137 The press release noted
that gay Iranians have sought asylum in the United States and
suggested that this fact was evidence of the greater freedoms here in
the United States and lesser freedoms there in Iran.138
LGBT rights advocates found themselves in an unintended
allegiance with political conservatives in Washington who, despite
long and vitriolic opposition to positive legal rights for homosexuals
in the United States, opportunistically used this moment to proclaim
the moral superiority of the United States compared to the hostile-togays Iranian government. They pointed to the intolerance of Islam
toward homosexuality as evidence of Iran’s backwardness, while
failing to mention that all but a few of the organized Christian
churches in the United States vehemently oppose the rights of gay
people.
Immediately after President Ahmadinejad’s speech, media
outlets and blogs recirculated a horrible picture of two young Iranian
men being hanged in 2005, ostensibly for being gay.139 At the time of
135.
Id.
136.
Press Release, Columbia Law Sch. Sexuality & Gend. Law Clinic,
supra note 85.
137.
Id.
138.
Id.
139.
See, e.g., Iran Continues To Execute Gays, Joe. My. God. (Nov. 13,
2007),
http://joemygod.blogspot.com/2007/11/iran-continue-to-execute-gays.html
(describing the release of the photos); see also Steve Shives, Ahmadinejad Denied
More Than the Holocaust This Time, Yahoo! Voices (Sept. 26, 2007),
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the execution in 2005 there had been a vocal outcry from the
international human rights community decrying this kind of
treatment of Iranian gay men.140 Tom Lantos, then a member of the
U.S. Congress and a Holocaust survivor who had long been an
adamant supporter of Israel and a critic of Arab states or states
influenced by Islam, strongly condemned the action: “This sickening
episode shines a bright light on the severe shortcomings of the
Iranian legal system. . . . [I]n this case, authorities apparently chose
to play on deep-seated feelings of bigotry toward homosexuality.”141
The Belgian Foreign Minister and a British gay rights group
similarly joined the protest. Peter Tatchell, a British activist, claimed
“this was just the latest barbarity by the Islamo-fascists in Iran.”142
It turns out, however, that the young men in this picture were
very likely prosecuted for sexually assaulting a thirteen-year old boy,
not for consensual homosexual conduct.143 Reports of their

http://voices.yahoo.com/ahmadinejad-denied-more-than-holocaust-time571138.html?cat=9 (discussing the 2005 public hangings of the two teenagers in
the context of Ahmadinejad’s 2007 speech at Columbia University).
140.
See, e.g., Report: Gay Youths Hanged in Iran, Towleroad, (July 20,
2005), http://www.towleroad.com/2005/07/report_gay_yout.html (decrying the
hanging of the two men).
141.
Press Release, Rep. Tom Lantos, Rep. Lantos Deplores Iran’s Killing
of Gays (July 27, 2005), available at mpetrelis.blogspot.com/2005/07/rep.html.
142.
Execution of Gay Teens in Iran—Ayatollahs Have Murdered 100,000
People, Peter Tatchell (July 27, 2005) http://www.petertatchell.net/international/
iran/iranexecution.htm. The term “Islamo-fascist” is not original to Peter Tatchell,
but has a history traceable back to conservative commentators who sought an
effective neologism to link modern states made up of predominantly Muslim
populations to European fascist states in the early to mid-19th century. David
Horowitz’s Freedom Center has organized something dreadfully called “IslamoFascism Awareness Week” on college campuses in the last several years, with the
purported aim of educating students about the imminent threat of radical Islam,
but with a more frank design of intimidating Muslim students and women’s
studies departments. A Student’s Guide to Hosting Islamo-Fascism Awareness
Week, Terrorism Awareness Project, http://www.terrorismawareness.org/islamofascism-awareness-week/49/a-students-guide-to-hosting-islamo-fascismawareness-week/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2012). Columbia University faculty
members have been a particular target of these events. Horowitz’s Freedom
Center, working together with CampusWatch, has launched efforts to discredit
several faculty members whose scholarship and teaching have included sympathy
toward the struggle for Palestinian statehood, the plight of Palestinian people, or
criticism of Israeli state policy. Larry Cohler-Esses, The New McCarthyism,
Nation (Oct. 25, 2007), http://www.thenation.com/article/new-mccarthyism#.
143.
Press Release, Amnesty Int’l, Iran Continues to Execute Minors and
Juvenile
Offenders
(July
22,
2005),
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homosexuality had originated with an opposition group in Iran—the
National Council of Resistance of Iran—knowing full well that the
international media and human rights community would pick up on it
immediately as a justification for criticism of the Iranian
government.144 And they were right. Meanwhile, there were local
groups in Iran that had galvanized support for the reform of the
death penalty and criminal laws applying to children through the use
of the case of the hanging of these two young men.145 This work was
severely undermined when the international community intervened
and plucked these two boys out for special treatment because they
were “gay.”146
I raise this not to deny that the Iranian government has a
policy of persecuting men who have sex with men, or women who
have sex with women, but rather to illustrate how many of the events
in Iran must be understood in light of how they are inextricably
intertwined with global politics, in which rights-based claims for
sexual liberty are used by states as the lever to pry other state
interests loose. These images, stories, prosecutions, executions, and
statements are taken up and manipulated in the service of narratives
of modernity, backwardness, threats to the sovereignty of Iran,
threats by Iran to the sovereignty of other nations such as Israel or
Iraq, and internal politics and resistance within Iran itself, as the last
example clearly illustrates. That the possibly fabricated persecution
of gay men could be so easily tossed up by the domestic political
opposition in Iran to an international audience—already poised to
criticize the Iranian government—should itself give us pause when
we consider the role of sexuality in struggles for and against global
citizenship.

http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE13/038/2005/en/1628dceb-d4c711dd-8a23-d58a49c0d652/mde130382005en.html.
144.
See Richard Kim, Witness to an Execution, Nation (Aug. 7, 2005),
http://www.thenation.com/article/witnesses-execution (discussing the unclear
circumstances surrounding the 2005 execution and the spread of news about the
incident via Iranian and Western media).
145.
See, e.g., Nobel Laureate Condemns Hanging of 2 Teenage Boys,
Chicago Trib. (July 24, 2005), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2005-0724/news/0507240331_1_shirin-ebadi-raping-teenage-boys (noting that Nobel
Peace laureate Shirin Ebadi has stated that her organization, the Center for the
Protection of Human Rights, “will intensify its fight against Iran’s execution of
minors”).
146.
Interview with Afsaneh Najmabadi, Francis Lee Higginson Professor
of History & of Studies of Women, Gend. & Sexuality, Harvard Univ., in
Cambridge, Mass. (Sept. 20, 2008).
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V. ISRAEL REDUX
In some respects, the deployment of LGBT rights by states to
further other national and nationalist interests is nothing new.
Woodrow Wilson “used” the enfranchisement of women in the United
States in the immediate post-World War I period as a means by
which to champion the moral superiority of the United States., The
U.S. military was racially integrated by Harry Truman after World
War II for reasons that had as much to do with efforts to distinguish
the United States from the Soviet Union as with the rightness of
African American civil rights.147 Likewise, the universalist humanism
that underlies the post-World War II human rights paradigm always
risks a kind of biopolitics that should give us pause, whether the
rights asserted are on behalf of LGBT people in Egypt or Romania, on
behalf of women undergoing genital cutting in Sudan, against foot
binding in Japan, or abortion rights in the United States and
elsewhere.148
To be honest, I’m happy sitting out the internecine battle
between the likes of Joseph Massad, on the one hand, and the LGBT
advocates at Human Rights Watch, on the other, when it comes to the
impossible goal of getting the descriptive project “right” on the
question of identity and sexual practices. For present purposes, I
have a different bone to pick. It has to do with who and what is
actualized when the LGBT subject is given a voice through the
intervention of human rights. To what degree should a state’s
operationalization of sexuality and sexual rights trigger a set of
ethical concerns back at the home office of the NGOs working to
advance sex and sexuality-based human rights? When non-state
actors seek to engage the human rights apparatus in the name of the
rights and freedom of certain populations and practices, what sort of
duty do they have to take into account the ways in which the meaning
and implications of their work may not be of their own making or
design?

147.
See Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the InterestConvergence Dilemma, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 518, 524–25 (1980).
148.
Is the “right” feminist ending to the film Juno (Fox Searchlight
Pictures 2007), one where she has the abortion rather than carries the child to
term? For a smart discussion of the biopolitics of abortion rights, see Lauren
Berlant, A Barrel of Acid and a Barrel of Water, Supervalent Thought (Feb. 24,
2008), http://supervalentthought.com/2008/02/24/a-barrel-of-acid-and-a-barrel-ofwater-or-things-happen-like-this/ (discussing Christian Mungiu’s film 4 Months, 3
Weeks and 2 Days (BAC Films 2007)).
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Lauren Berlant has urged that we concern ourselves with a
kind of moral atrophy that sets into some rights-based social
movements precisely at the moment that the state “takes up” their
cause.149 Might a kind of atrophy be at risk when the state starts
doing the heavy lifting related to defending the rights of sexual
minorities, as we saw in the examples I discussed above? Whether in
the sodomy reform politics of post-Ceausescu Romania or in today’s
same sex marriage politics in the United States, there is a risk that
the rights-bearing gay subject—a new “good citizen”—emerges in the
foreground of a national landscape while at the same time producing
at its margin others who are not so good.
We might laud Israel’s political leadership when it stood up
for the gays after the Tel Aviv shooting, but we ought to note the
circumstances when these leaders stood down in the face of similar
violence perpetrated in more trying circumstances from the
perspective of the liberal state. Prime Minister Netanyahu came out
as a defender of gay Israelis when attacks were made against
innocent young people who had gathered privately in Tel Aviv, but
not when members of the Israeli religious right attacked radical
queers who marched in the streets of Jerusalem.150 A “gay right” is
not a “gay right” is not a “gay right.” The LGBT kids in the
basement—by no means deserving any form of attack—posed little
challenge to the liberal state, whereas the queers in the streets just
might have. Aeyal Gross has posed an even more difficult challenge:
“Israeli politicians and the GLBT community must ask whether the
massacre of children in Gaza, and in Sderot, is less shocking that [sic]
that of children on Nachmani Street in Tel-Aviv [where the Aguda is
located].”151
This is all to say that a particular kind of caution is called for
when the state becomes a partner in the project of converting wrongs
into rights and outlaws into rights-bearing citizens. As Nietzsche
observed in the late nineteenth century, liberal or progressive causes
become significantly less liberal or progressive as soon as they are

149.
Id. (drawing from Mladen Dolar, At First Sight, in Gaze and Voice as
Love Objects: Sic 1, at 129 (Renata Salecl & Slavoj Zizek eds., 1996) and 4
Months, 3 Weeks and 2 Days).
150.
Jonathan Lis & Amiram Barkat, J’lem Gay Parade Halted
After Protester Stabs 3 Marchers, Haaretz (July 1, 2005, 12:00 AM),
http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/j-lem-gay-parade-halted-afterprotester-stabs-3-marchers-1.162735.
151.
Aeyal Gross, Harvey Milk Was Here, Zeek: Jewish J. Thought &
Culture (Oct. 25, 2009), http://zeek.forward.com/articles/115761.
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embraced by the state.152 His conclusion that “there are no worse and
no more thorough injurers of freedom than liberal institutions,”153
may press the point further than I would like, yet the idea is one with
resonance for present purposes. As John D’Emilio taught us in Sexual
Politics, Sexual Communities,154 the legibility of modern homosexual
identity has been intimately tied to the interests and needs of the
liberal state, and in the cases I have discussed here we see evidence
of how modern liberal states have made good use of their rightsbearing homosexual citizens.
Noting the duplicity of the state’s homo-friendliness is not
enough. Rather the “patriotized” rights-bearing LGBT subject and
“its” movement have a duty to actively resist being mustered into
nationalist projects undertaken in its name and purportedly on its
behalf.
Once we recognize that the normative homosexuality that
undergirds human rights discourse is not merely a “fact” in the world,
but more of a complex value, it becomes easier to see how the state’s
embrace of the sexual citizenship of these new human rights holders
risks rendering more vulnerable a range of identities and policies that
have refused to conform to state-endorsed normative homo- or heterosexuality. This is true both for queers whose desires refuse to orient
themselves ineluctably toward marriage, as well as for Muslims with
sexual norms and practices of polyamory, homosociality, and
modesty.155 Under this scenario, newly enfranchised gay citizens find
themselves implicated, whether they want to or not, in the
construction and identification of the “enemies of the state.” Witness
the ingenious strategy of StandWithUs and the Israeli Foreign
Ministry to appeal to gay rights supporters in their efforts to shore up
Israel’s foreign policy objectives with respect to Palestine and Iran.156
The challenge of disentangling the state’s agenda from our
own is enormously difficult, in no small measure due to the degree to
which the problem is set up by what Foucault called the “incitement
to discourse.”157 With this he sought to capture the process by which
152.
Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, in The Portable Nietzsche
541 (Walter Kaufmann ed. 1976).
153.
Id.
154.
John D’Emilio, Sexual Politics, Sexual Communities: The Making of a
Homosexual Minority in the United States 1940–1970 (1983).
155.
This is among the arguments made by Puar, supra note 9.
156.
See supra notes 55–59, 61–69 and accompanying text.
157.
Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1: An Introduction 17–
35 (Robert Hurley trans., 1st ed. 1978) (1976).
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“taking sex ‘into account’”158 transforms it from something understood
within the grasp of morality (how do we judge it along a continuum of
sacred to disgusting) to that of reason (how do we make it useful).
Remarkably, the way he describes the eighteenth century rational
turn in conceptualizing sexuality applies with equal measure to the
contemporary examples I offer in this essay:
[O]ne had to speak of it as of a thing to be not simply
condemned or tolerated but managed, inserted into
systems of utility, regulated for the greater good of all,
made to function according to an optimum. Sex was
not something one simply judged; it was a thing one
administered. It was in the nature of a public
potential.159
The public potential of sex and sexuality in today’s context has
materialized in homonationalist policies when states gain political
power by and through the granting of civil rights to “their” sexual
minorities. Civil rights, in this regard, not only enable the expansion
of state power, but also have had the felicitous effect of de-politicizing
the communities in whose name those rights are mobilized.160
Does this discussion leave us helpless in the face of a critique
that eschews both the epistemic violence of securing human rights for
global gay subjects on the one hand, and state politics as cynical,
manipulative, instrumental, and tragic on the other? To be sure, this
is where some find themselves. But we can do better than that.
Critical awareness of the state’s role as now-fundamental partner in
158.
Id. at 24.
159.
Id.
160.
“[T]he language of gay rights in the Arab world is a double bind: we
must use it in order to achieve restitution from very real, and very immediate
oppression, but as we use this language it mobilizes us in a struggle to transform
questions of social, political, and economic justice into claims of discrimination.
This discrimination, in turn, can only be addressed by nation states or by
international political bodies that are actively involved in oppressing our peoples,
our families and loved ones, and the parts of us that not captured by the LGBTQ
paradigm. We cannot ‘choose’ to not be who we have become, but we
must recognize how we have been formed as neoliberal rights seeking
and speaking bodies, and how this formation is linked to a history of
depoliticization and alienation. In other words, we must be both tactical
and skeptical when this language reaches to embrace us, and when we, as
activists and as academics, use it ourselves. We must find ways to critically
inhabit this homonational world and try, always, to act within the uncomfortable
and precarious line between rights and justice.” Maya Mikdashi, Gay Rights as
Human Rights: Pinkwashing Homonationalism, Jadaliyya (Dec. 16, 2011),
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/3560/gay-rights-as-human-rights_
pinkwashing-homonationa.
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the recognition and protection of a form of sexual rights should push
us to regard these “victories” as necessarily ethically compromised.
The moral atrophy that has kept us from recognizing the
tragedy of these strategies and outcomes is where more critical, and
indeed discomfiting, work needs to be done by theorists and activists
alike. This means rethinking the horizon of success. “Victory” in the
sense of gaining the state as a partner, rather than an adversary, in
the struggle to recognize and defend LGBT rights ought to set off a
trip wire that ignites a new set of strategies and politics. This must
necessarily include a deliberate effort to counteract, if not sabotage,
the pull of the state to enlist rights-based movements into its larger
governance projects, accompanied by an affirmative resistance to
conceptions of citizenship that figure nationality by and through the
creation of a constitutive other who resides in the state’s and human
rights’ outside.

VI. CONCLUSION
I will end with Israel, just as I began this essay, to highlight a
community that has resisted some of the moral atrophy that often
accompanies conscription in the state’s larger projects. Some queer
activists in Israel have parted company with the mainstream of the
LGBT community, rejecting the terms of the deal made with the
Israeli government whereby their rights are recognized in exchange
for being used as a public relations tool.161 The 2010 Tel Aviv gay
pride parade was held only a few days after the Gaza flotilla raid, and
the more radical/queer wing of the community chose to hold an
alternative parade in which they would disidentify queer people with
the sort of nationalism that the state had been actively cultivating,
thus reinforcing a kind of anti-nationalist identification.162 Their
banners read: “There is no Pride in the Occupation.”163 These
queer/left politics were met with an even greater homonationalization
of the mainstream Gay Pride Parade, resisting what they termed the
“occupation” of gay pride by queers who identified with the

161.
This is how Aeyal Gross has put it in his analysis of the current rift
between gay and queer activists in Israel. See Gross, supra note 53 (discussing the
rift between queer radical activists and supporters of homonationalism, and
noting that “gay rights have essentially become a public-relations tool”).
162.
Aeyal Gross, The Politics of GLBT Rights in Israel (and Beyond):
Between Queer Politics and Homonationalism 26–28 (unpublished manuscript
presented at Columbia Law School, Oct. 18, 2010) (on file with author).
163.
Id.
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Palestinians not with Israel.164 Their signs and stickers, donned for
the main parade, offered a retort to the signs of the anti-nationalists:
“[N]o to the occupation of the parade,” and “I am a proud Zionist.”165
In the end, the resistance of some Israeli queers to their cooptation
into a nationalist project provoked an invigorated re-nationalization
of the Gay Pride Parade in response, resulting in the proliferation of
Israeli flags held by parade-goers.166 Nevertheless, this intervention
introduced and cemented a link between the dangers of Israeli
nationalism, religious fundamentalism, and homophobia in a way
that shifted the frame for gay politics in Israel.
Queer activists in Israel offer an example of a new kind of
politics that at once appreciates the value of rights and launches new
strategies to resist the perils of partnership with the state. Having
said that, it is important to note how narrow the room for this work is
and how perilous it can be. In February of 2011, I received an e-mail
from the Office of Cultural Affairs of the Israeli Consulate letting me
know that the Embassy was sponsoring a U.S. tour of a new
documentary on the early days of the Israeli gay rights movement.
“We would love to try and organize a screening and talk with Yair
[Qedar, the filmmaker] at Columbia University,” the official wrote
me. Worried that I was being invited to participate in a pinkwashing
event, I e-mailed my colleague, Aeyal Gross, a law professor at Tel
Aviv University, and asked whether he knew anything about the
filmmaker or the film, Gay Days, and whether this was “the usual
sort of propaganda.” He wrote me back immediately,
Yair—the director—is a friend and the film is
certainly not propaganda. I’m sure some will consider
any depiction of gay rights in [I]srael as such but you
know that’s not a view I share—we should be able to
talk of gay rights in [I]srael even if [it] is also coopted. . . . . I think that it almost impossible to
distinguish Israeli government promoting culture
from the political uses of that, but as I say the film is
not a propaganda effort—not coming from there at all
(even if government promotes it for its own purposes).
The director was involved in [grassroots] activism and
founded Israeli gay monthly which under his

164.
165.
166.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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leadership was a voice for queer thought (I used to
write there regularly) and its dissemination.167
In Aeyal’s response lies the challenge of activism in the era of
homonationalist politics. Once the state takes up your cause—for the
dual purpose of embracing greater rights and of advancing the state’s
own larger political aims—politics becomes much more complicated in
tragic ways. Jasbir Puar has termed the tethering of gay rights to
nationalist projects a kind of “golden handcuffs.”168
Working on the role of LGBT rights in relation to
Israel/Palestine is particularly challenging in this regard, given that
any critique of Israeli state policy (and it is important to reiterate
that I am talking about state policy, not individual Israelis or Jews) is
immediately tagged as anti-semitic. What is more, recently enacted
Israeli law makes careful political engagement with these hard issues
even more difficult. The “Boycott Bill” passed by the Knesset in July
of 2011 allows Israeli citizens to bring civil suits against persons and
organizations that call for economic, cultural, or academic boycotts
against Israel, Israeli institutions, or regions under Israeli control.169
It also prevents the government from doing business with companies
that initiate or comply with such boycotts.170
I must confess that I have experienced aggressive, sometimes
violent, reactions to the recent work I have done that expresses
sympathy for the rights of Palestinians and offers criticisms of Israeli
state policy. As someone who has often taken unpopular positions in
the LGBT and feminist communities,171 I thought I was prepared for
the backlash that engagement with pinkwashing might generate.172 I
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2011),
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wasn’t. Both our “golden handcuffs,” to borrow Puar’s term, and the
chilling effect of the blowback certain political critique now receives,
has made very crabbed room for politics and intellectual work that
questions the role sexual civil rights now play in larger nationalist
projects.
Queer activists in Israel/Palestine have something to teach us
about what it means to do politics that resists state occupation. In
their own ways, on either side of the so-called security “fence”
(hafrada) or “wall” (jadir), some queers in the region are carving a
path that neither privileges a global “gay citizen” nor succumbs to
raw nationalism or racism/anti-semitism. The Palestinian queers I
have met have a complex analysis of the relationship of occupation to
homophobia, and refuse to privilege their experience of one over the
other. They are acutely aware of and their politics respond to the
ways in which negative social and cultural attitudes toward
homosexuality in Palestinian culture are shaped in important ways
by the occupation itself. They resist a politics that elevates a
particular kind of sexual identity, such as gay or lesbian, over and
apart from their identity as Palestinian. In this sense, their task has
been so much more complicated than merely making demands for a
gay pride parade in al-Manara Square in the center of Ramallah.
Rather they situate queer politics within a complex web of Israeli
occupation, nationalist resistance to the occupation, the weakness of
the Palestinian Authority, the rise of Islamist politics, and a
Palestinian biopolitical project that figures reproduction and the
hetero-normative family as vital to national survival. All of these
dynamics “have had serious consequences for Palestinian queers, not
because Islam is an inherently (or particularly) ‘homophobic’ religion,
but because Islamism has ascribed a (negative) ideological value to
‘homosexuality’ that did not exist before.”173
So too, radical queer voices in Israel have refused the appeal
of the new queer nationalism that they have been offered. They insist
on drawing connections between the radicalism of the settlers’
homophobia/sexism and their imperial project in Palestine. The
creation of social space for out LGBT people in Israel has occurred
alongside the evacuation of Palestinians from that same territory.
The one doesn’t necessarily cause the other, but the former has been
used in the service of the latter. As one Israeli human rights lawyer
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from Tel Aviv told a group of us on the first LGBTI delegation to
Israel/Palestine in January 2012, “Tel Aviv may be the most gay city
in the world, but it’s also the least Arab you’ll find in the Middle
East.”174
This is what queering our politics demands: a refusal to take
up the frames, and the identities those frames call up, which
“winning” our rights produces. As it also turns out, rights are
something the state is particularly well-suited to provide, and, as it
turns out, those very rights end up being quite easily requisitioned by
the state to advance its own larger interests. It falls on us, those in
whose name those rights materialize, to resist the seduction of the
state that, at long last, offers us its embrace, and in return seeks
collaboration in its own imperial projects.
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